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The Political Codification of Islamic Law: A 
Closer Look at the Draft Shi’i Personal Status 
Code of Iraq 
Haider Ala Hamoudi1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article will show that the perceived equivalence between 
social conservatism in the Muslim world and adherence to traditional 
religious rules is a false one. The point is not that social conservatives 
ignore religious rules entirely, any more than liberals do. Rather, they 
apply such rules selectively, manipulating and reformulating them in 
the process in a manner that suits a preexisting ideological vision that 
seeks the preservation of existing social hierarchies and authorities. 
This is not terribly different in the end from the methods of the liberal, 
even if the liberal aims involve the realization of a very different social 
and religious order from those of the social conservative. 
It is obvious that Muslim liberals, meaning those whose 
commitments lie both to the religion of Islam as well as to core liberal 
values, have a problem with the codification of the more traditionalist 
forms of the shari’a.2 This is particularly, but not exclusively, true in 
1 Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Research and Faculty 
Development, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. [The author would like to 
thank Kecia Ali, Ali Reza Bhojani, Mohammad Fadel and Asifa Quraishi, for their 
generous comments and support. All errors are the author’s alone.] 
2 March provides an excellent description of liberal values, and the constraints 
they impose on citizens of a liberal state in his own discussions of Islam and 
liberalism. In his words, 
There is very little disagreement among liberals (or even Western political 
theorists critical of liberalism) about what [liberalism] entails and what 
types of practices liberalism are expected to endorse through their doctrines: 
Substate groups cannot draw on religious or cultural authority to prevent 
individuals from leaving a group, cannot prevent children from becoming 
aware of other forms of life in the society and from gaining the skills to 
survive in it, cannot coercively impose marital decisions on family 
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the area of personal status, encompassing family law, wills and 
inheritance.3 Traditionalists working within the historic schools of 
Islamic law developed rules for marriage that required a woman’s 
sexual obedience to her husband,4 permitted a father to compel his 
child into marriage,5 and enabled a man to unilaterally end his 
members, cannot do certain things to their children that are physically 
harmful (like female genital mutilation or depriving children of urgent 
medical attention), and cannot punish members in certain ways for 
dissenting from or criticizing communal authority. Simply put, liberalism 
establishes a certain range of civil rights and liberties for all citizens and 
does not recognize the right of any cultural or religious authority to deprive 
its members of these rights any more than it does the state. . . . ANDREW 
MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERALISM: THE SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING 
CONSENSUS 98 (2009) [Citations omitted]. 
March’s project involves an inquiry into whether or not there is sufficiently 
overlapping ground between liberalism and Islam that a Muslim committed to the 
more traditional understandings of the shari’a could nevertheless find grounds in 
Islamic law for a doctrine of citizenship in a non-Muslim liberal society. March, 
supra at 102. That worthy endeavor is distinct from the point made in the main text, 
which is that the codification of the traditionalist rules of the shari’a are deeply 
problematic to a liberal. In other words, to concretize the matter, there is a difference 
between asking whether a Muslim can support a non-Muslim liberal state that would 
permit a coreligionist to leave the faith, and whether a liberal, Muslim or otherwise, 
could support a law that sought to criminalize apostasy. The former inquiry, which 
is March’s, is quite interesting and worthy of study. As to the latter question, as the 
main text notes, anyone committed to liberal values as defined above would 
necessarily answer in the negative. The matter is so obvious as to be nearly 
definitional. 
3 See Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi 
Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 731 (2004) (describing personal 
status as encompassing “marriage, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and other 
family-related matters.”) 
4 Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1063-64 (2004). 
5 JUDITH TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW 43 (2008) 
(“All legal schools agreed that a father had a right to marry [a bride in her legal 
minority] to whomever he chose without consulting her; the father enjoyed similar 
rights to marry off his minor sons.”). This is discussed more extensively in Section 
III.C infra. 
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marriage to his wife without court involvement.6 To the extent that a 
state would try to codify these or similar rules, the Muslim liberal 
would be committed to opposing it, and to articulating an alternative 
vision of Islam. There is no shortage of material by Muslim liberals 
providing such different understandings of Islamic sacred text in 
manners that are simultaneously reformist, liberal and yet reverential 
in their strong commitment to Islam and Islamic values.7 These 
articulations are entirely plausible, give the lie to Islamophobic 
movements that seek to reduce Islam to a caricature,8 and deserve more 
attention than they receive. It is also fair to note, however, that the 
6 Id. at 86. (“[I]n its baldest form, a man could end his marriage simply by 
pronouncing a formula of divorce, after which his wife must wait a statutory period 
. . . before the divorce was automatically finalized. There was no role for the court, 
no possibility of contest by the wife, and only limited obligations imposed on the 
husband for payment of any dower he owed and temporary support of his wife while 
she waited for the divorce to be finalized.”) 
7 For just a short sampling of the formidable literature on this subject, see 
generally FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION OF AN 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION (1984) (articulating an ambitious reformation of Islam’s 
intellectual traditions in order to render them compatible with modernity); 
ABDULLAHI AN NAIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1986)(developing a theory of sacred text 
that focuses less on specific rules, and more on broader principles); KECIA ALI, 
SEXUAL ETHICS & ISLAM: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON QUR’AN, HADITH AND 
JURISPRUDENCE (2006)(offering a searching look at the extent to which Islam may 
be made compatible with modern conceptions of women’s rights); AMINA WADUD, 
QUR’AN AND WOMAN: REREADING THE SACRED TEXT FROM A WOMAN’S 
PERSPECTIVE (1999)(suggesting that the Qur’an when read from a perspective other 
than the traditional and patriarchal is not as gender discriminatory as it is often 
perceived to be). 
8 In the words of the respected scholar of Islam, John L. Esposito,  
It is not difficult to find material that emphasizes selective analyses and 
events in the Muslim world, material which is crisis oriented and headline-
driven, fueling stereotypes, fears and discrimination. Islam’s portrayal as a 
triple threat (political, civilizational and demographic) has been magnified 
by a number of journalists and scholars who trivialize the complexity of 
political, social and religious dynamics in the Muslim world. 
John L. Esposito, Foreword to ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY: HOW THE RIGHT 
MANUFACTURES FEAR OF MUSLIMS (2012). 
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articulated Islamic vision seems as influenced by exogenous 
commitments to liberal values as it is to Islam itself. 
The same set of perceptions and assumptions respecting dual 
commitments does not seem to exist, however, when considering 
Muslim social conservatives, a term I use to refer to those who are 
interested in preserving traditional hierarchies and authorities within 
Islamic societies, and who therefore oppose significant changes to the 
existing social order.9 Muslim social conservatives, precisely because 
they wish to maintain an existing order, are presumed to be motivated 
almost exclusively by some sort of unshakeable commitment to 
traditionalist understandings of the shari’a, in contrast to the liberal, 
who is committed both to Islam and to liberalism. Hence, “strict” 
Islamic law is referenced to address a panoply of positions advanced 
by socially conservative forces within Islamic societies, whether that 
is the closing of movie theaters,10 the severing of hands of 
businesspeople who operate without a license,11 or even the ripping of 
gold teeth from the mouths of citizens.12 “Literalism” has come to 
mean the rejection of all Western influences13 and, of course, 
9 I am less concerned in this Article about whether such social conservatives are 
also political conservatives. That is to say, a Muslim social conservative may be a 
tribal leader with little interest in exercising control over the state, or he or she may 
be a member of an Islamist political party who explicitly seeks political power to 
ensure that traditional social hierarchies are maintained. Both fit within the rubric of 
“social conservative” as defined in the main text. I certainly do not use of the terms 
“liberal” and “conservative” to refer in any way to contemporary political disputes 
in the United States, which bear no relevance here. 
10 Movies, Music Banned, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 15, 1996 at A4. 
11 Ghaddafi Reinterprets Strict Islamic Law, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 1994 at 
A13. 
12 Somalia: Islamists Pulling Teeth from ‘Sinners’, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Aug. 11, 
2009 at A6. 
13 See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Are Salafis Literalists?, ISLAMIC LAW IN OUR TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2012), http://muslimlawprof.org/2012/09/are-salafists-literalists/  
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international terrorism, justified through jihad.14 It should be obvious 
that none of these is in fact a “strict” or “literal” application of 
anything, but rather all are interpretations of varying plausibility of 
original sources and traditional, historic commentaries. Could anyone 
believe that seventh century sacred source material, or medieval 
interpretations of that source material, have anything “strict” or 
“literal” to say about flying a plane into a skyscraper? 
Once so framed, the problem for the liberal or the reformer is rather 
obvious. After all, if the conservative follows strictly, and to the letter, 
the traditionalist readings of the sacred texts, then the liberal is left 
working out a contextual (as opposed to literal) and flexible (as 
opposed to strict) interpretation influenced by foreign ideas. In other 
words, the conservative follows the Word strictly and is “pure”,15 
while the liberal manipulates it so as to cause it to harmonize it with 
other values held dear. The liberal is therefore at a distinct 
disadvantage when seeking to persuade the committed believer of the 
plausibility of any given liberal position in light of its perceived 
contamination. 
Using a particularly salient example of legislation initiated very 
recently, the primary purpose of this Article is to demonstrate how 
deep and fundamental a mistake it is to presume that conservative 
commitment is the same as fealty to any pure conception of religious 
law. Specifically, this Article shows that even within the area of 
personal status, where Muslim social conservative commitment to 
14 Martin Regg Cohn, Inoculated Against Religious Radicalism; Mainstream 
Disenchantment With Fundamentalism Is Clear In The World's Largest Muslim 
Nation, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 27, 2005 at A12. 
15 “Pure” is another term used to describe Muslim social conservatives. See, e.g., 
ALI ALLAWI, THE CRISIS OF ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION 250 (2009) (describing the 
manner in which Rashid Ridha turned against “reformed Islam” later in his life and 
opted to endorse the “purer, Salafi variety”). Allawi does not hesitate to criticize the 
ultraconservative, Salafist philosophies elsewhere in his work as ahistorical and 
hardly in keeping with Islamic intellectual traditions. Allawi, supra at 38-39. When 
even a bold and iconoclastic intellectual like him uses the word “pure” to describe 
Salafism, juxtaposing it against Ridha’s earlier reformist ideas, it is apparent that 
there is something wrong with our nomenclature. 
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shari’a is strongest, there are not insignificant divergences between 
traditionalist expectations of Muslim social conservatives, and the 
actual rules set forth in the doctrine. Moreover, where such 
divergences exist, legislative drafters defer to the Muslim social 
conservative expectations, at the expense of doctrine. This is 
important, because it explodes the false equivalence between 
conservatism and religious commitment. If the Muslim social 
conservative cannot remain committed, that is, to the most traditional 
and historic renderings of the rules of personal status, so much so that 
the law is then changed to meet social conservative demands rather 
than realize religious law, then how seriously can it contended that the 
motivations of the Muslim social conservative relate purely to 
adherence to traditional understandings of religion? In the end, isn’t 
the Muslim social conservative engaged in the same practice as the 
Muslim liberal—molding, shaping, manipulating and ignoring various 
pieces and parts of doctrine to render it compatible with a series of 
preexisting commitments which are only partly religious in their 
origins? The result does not necessarily privilege liberal readings over 
conservative ones, but at the very least it tends to put them on a level 
playing field, and permits us to see the contentions as less driven by 
doctrine, and more by ideological commitment. In other words, the 
Muslim social conservative prefers existing hierarchies and structures, 
and the Muslim liberal seeks to change them. Neither of those 
preferences necessarily has much to do with fealty to shari’a. 
The specific example I have selected to demonstrate this point is 
the draft Ja’fari Personal Status Code of Iraq, approved by the Iraqi 
cabinet in the spring of 2014 and sent to the legislature for enactment 
shortly thereafter.16 Though never enacted given the subsequent rise 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria17 as well as elections that led to 
16 Suadad al-Salhy, Iraqi Women Demonstrate Against Proposed Iraqi Law in 
Iraq, REUTERS, March 8, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-iraq-
women-islam-idUSBREA270NR20140308. 
17 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) took control of Mosul in the 
summer of 2014, a few months after the Ja’fari Personal Status Code was introduced. 
See Martin Chulov, ISIS Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul, Guardian 
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the designation of a new Prime Minister,18 the draft is particularly 
relevant to the themes of this Article for two reasons. First of all, it is 
a result of decades-long efforts by Iraq’s Shi’a to enact a Personal 
Status Code specific to the Shi’i community that adheres more closely 
to Shi’i rules than the existing Personal Status Code does.19 This 
renders adherence to traditional rules in the draft Code important. 
Secondly, unlike their Sunni counterparts, Shi’i jurists operating in the 
seminaries located in the Holy City of Najaf retain broad levels of 
legitimacy and authority respecting the content of shari’a.20 This 
renders the traditional rules relatively easy to locate. If there was a law, 
then, where one would expect very close and faithful adherence to 
traditional rules to exist, it would be the draft Ja’fari Personal Status 
Code. Departures from the rules should be both obvious (given how 
easy it is to identify the Shi’i rules) and unjustifiable (given that the 
very purpose of the project is to enable the Shi’a to live by their 
traditional rules).  
And yet, in any number of cases, as the Article makes clear, there 
is substantial divergence from the juristic rules clearly established in 
Najaf. In each case, the divergence appears to lie in an area where the 
core constituency of Shi’i social conservatives who might be expected 
to support such draft legislation, indeed the constituency whose 
electoral support was being solicited in preparing the draft, had 
expectations and commitments that stood in important contrast to 
(UK), June 10, 2014, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-
militants-seize-control-mosul. 
18 Haider al-Abadi was named the Prime Minister of Iraq on August 11, 2014, 
replacing Nouri al-Maliki, who had held the position previously and was quite 
reluctant to give it up. Adam Taylor, Meet Haider al-Abadi, The Man Named Iraq’s 
New Prime Minister, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2014, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/08/11/meet-haider-al-
abadi-the-man-named-iraqs-new-prime-minister/  
19 This is described in detail in Section I.A infra. 
20 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative 
Process and State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 523, 539 (2007). 
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those of the jurists. It is thus quite clear that the drafters of the Ja’fari 
Personal Status Code did not make any real effort to realize some 
pristine form of religious doctrine. Rather, they presented a 
transmogrified version designed to meet the expectations of modern 
Muslim social conservatives. This does not make it per se illegitimate, 
merely no less and no more legitimate than the vision of the liberal, 
whose preferences lie not in preserving traditional hierarchies and 
modalities of authority, but upending them. To privilege the 
conservative position as being a purer form of shari’a, the Article 
concludes, is dangerous and hardly conducive to religious reform 
within the Islamic tradition. 
Part I provides some necessary context respecting the perduring 
Islamist Shi’i demand spanning decades for the repeal of the existing 
Iraqi Personal Status Code and its replacement with a law that reflects 
the juristic rules more closely. It also describes the specific political 
conditions prevailing in Iraq in the spring of 2014 that caused the draft 
Code to be recommended for enactment when it was. Having provided 
that context, Parts II-IV will demonstrate the manner in which the draft 
Code deviates from doctrine, specifically to conform to the 
expectations of the Muslim social conservative constituency that was 
expected to support it. Part II is devoted to the draft Code’s treatment 
of two major, long standing aspects of Shi’i law with deep pedigree 
which have proved problematic in modernity. The first is the favorite 
whipping boy of Shi’i legal doctrine, the temporary marriage.21 The 
second is child marriage, permitted across the Sunni and Shi’i 
traditional schools.22 The drafters all but ignored the first, while not 
only embracing but indeed expanding the second beyond traditional 
boundaries. The only possible explanation for such an otherwise odd 
21 The temporary marriage is discussed in Part II.A hereof. As for its repeated 
denunciations among Sunni polemicists, see, e.g., Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-
Munajjid, Mut’ah Marriage and the refutation of those Raafidis who permit it, Islam 
Question and Answer, http://islamqa.info/en/20738 (last checked February 2, 2015) 
(describing the Shi’a as “following their own whims and desires” in permitting the 
temporary marriage). 
22 Tucker, supra note __ at 43. 
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result is that socially conservative forces do not engage in or support 
the idea of temporary marriage, and indeed are embarrassed by its 
formal legality, while many (though certainly not all) support, and in 
a few cases practice, child marriage. Part III will turn to an even starker 
form of deference on the part of the drafters of the Code. The Part will 
show that where the interests of socially conservative institutions such 
as tribes conflicted with those of the jurists, the drafters privileged the 
tribes over the jurists specifically on the determination of the content 
of Islamic law. This is quite ironic given that the core objection of the 
existing Personal Status Code was that it stripped the jurists of their 
power to determine Islamic law and given it to lawmakers instead.23  
From the distortions of the draft Code described in Parts II and III, 
the Article then turns to juristic omissions and distortions in Part IV. 
Specifically, Part IV will address other parts of historic doctrine which 
have proved problematic in contemporary times; specifically, slavery 
and female genital mutilation. However, unlike the subjects of Part II, 
these are areas where jurists have themselves sought to manage the 
conflict between the historic rules and the expectations of their devout 
and socially conservative constituencies by omitting or distorting the 
historic rules, so as to avoid reciting a rule that is sure to earn a hostile 
reception. In these cases, the draft Code had something of an easier 
time, given that it could merely replicate the compendia of 
contemporary jurists and claim a faithfulness to the traditionalist rules 
of the Shi’a that did not in fact exist. 
Having thus demonstrated that the draft Personal Status Code is 
hardly the realization of historic Shi’i religious doctrine so much as it 
is the enactment of the ideological commitments of the substantial 
portion of the Iraqi Shi’i community that is socially conservative, the 
conclusion then argues that unless the substantial, presumed 
equivalence between Muslim social conservatism and Islamic law 
doctrine is severed, it will be nearly impossible to free Islam from the 
shackles of the socially conservative commitments with which it is 
currently so closely identified. 
23 This point is described in some detail in Part I infra. 
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I. The Curious Emergence of the Draft Ja’fari Personal Status 
Code 
A. Historic Shi’i Demands Respecting Personal Status 
If there ever was a place where one would expect a modern piece 
of legislation to replicate nearly entirely the law of the jurists, it would 
lie in a draft Personal Status Code designed for Iraq’s Shi’a. The Shi’i 
political and religious leaders who represented socially conservative 
elements of Iraqi society spent decades calling precisely for this, and 
for the repeal of the existing Personal Status Code in the process. In 
fact, the hostility among Islamist Shi’a to the existing, Iraqi Personal 
Status Code predates the enactment of that Code.24  
The Personal Status Code was written in 1959, intending to create 
a uniform law of personal status that would apply to all Iraqis.25 It is 
therefore an amalgam of sorts of different schools of thought within 
the Islamic tradition, Sunni and Shi’i, with the drafters of the Code 
selecting a rule based on whatever happened to appeal the most to their 
left leaning progressive sensibilities.26 Hence, for example, its rules of 
inheritance drew largely on Shi’i tradition, while the rules on judicial 
dissolution of marriage came from the Sunni, Maliki school of 
thought.27 Modest, but important, reforms beyond those in the juristic 
24 Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal 
System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 748-52 (2004). 
25 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Money Laundering Amidst Mortars: Legislative 
Process and State Authority in Post-Invasion Iraq, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 523, 543-46 (2007). 
26 See id. at 544. The Code was enacted one year after a revolution in Iraq that 
deposed the Iraqi monarchy and instituted what was called a “republic”, though in 
point of fact it was a dictatorship led by strongman Abdul Karim Qasim with the 
support of Abdul Rahman Arif. Qasim was not a communist, but his sympathies very 
much lay on the political left, and he did ally with the communist party at various 
times during his short period of rule. MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT AND PETER 
SLUGLETT, IRAQ SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION TO DICTATORSHIP 49-51,-58-59 
(2d ed. 2003). 
27 See, e.g., Personal Status Law, No. 188 of 1959 (Iraq) [hereinafter “Iraq 
Personal Status Code”], Art. 91(2) (concerning the inheritance of daughters) and Art. 
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manuals of any school of thought were made as well, including most 
prominently the banning of child marriages contracted by guardians.28 
The Shi’i opposition to the law, however, ran far deeper than a 
mere dispute over substance. In fact, most of the substantive objections 
that were actually articulated, then and now, appeared safely on the 
margins as a practical matter. These included, for example, the fact 
that a Shi’i marriage did not require two witnesses in order to be valid, 
and yet the Personal Status Code adopted the Sunni position that it did. 
Should, therefore, two people find themselves in a desert overtaken 
with unquenchable sexual desire, the law would present them with no 
alternatives to fornication.29 The Shi’i elite agitating for decades 
against the Personal Status Code surely did not think that this is an 
actual problem that arose with any degree of frequency. Even if they 
did, there are narrower ways of addressing it than repealing the entire 
Code. 
Instead, the core objections to the Code ran to the very conception 
of state control over rulemaking as concerns personal status.30 The idea 
that the state, rather than the jurists, would determine how many 
witnesses were needed to conclude a marriage struck Shi’a Islamists 
as offensive and requiring repeal for no reason other than that it 
suggested that someone other than the jurists should be able to 
determine the content of personal status rules.31 By the time of the 
enactment of the Personal Status Code, the Shi’a may have long 
acquiesced to the encroachment of secularized state law into the 
private law realm in any number of areas from property to contracts to 
43 (concerning the right of a wife to obtain a judicial dissolution of her marriage). 
For the Islamic origins of these various provisions, see MARK CAMMACK AND 
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN COURTS (forthcoming 2016)(on 
file with author). 
28 Personal Status Code, arts. 8-9. See also Cammack and Hamoudi, supra note 
__; Part IV.B infra, which discusses child marriage in Islamic law more broadly. 
29 Hamoudi, supra note __ at 100-01. 
30 Id. at 101. 
31 Id. 
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torts.32 However, the principle that personal status needed to remain 
firmly Islamic, and firmly juristic, held strong. Formally, the Shi’i 
Islamist demand was constant, and it was firm. The jurists, and only 
the jurists, could make the law of personal status. 
Hence, even as the Personal Status Code was being promulgated a 
half century ago, a prominent jurist and a scion of one of Najaf’s 
clerical families, Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, published a widely 
distributed pamphlet describing the deviations from juristic rules that 
were part of the Personal Status Code.33 Deliberately ecumenical, Bahr 
al-Ulum identified deviations that would prejudice Sunnis as much as 
those that would prejudice the Shi’a. Thus, for example, he included 
as criticism the rule that a drunk man could not validly divorce his wife 
under the Personal Status Code. This is in fact a replication of a Shi’i 
rule, but it diverges from the rule of the Hanafi Sunnis, the point being 
that it is no less fair to impose Shi’i rules on Sunnis than it is to impose 
Sunni rules on Shi’is.34 
The Personal Status Code was enacted in 1959 despite Bahr al-
Ulum’s criticisms. The objections to the Code nevertheless continued 
in circulation for some time, rising in particular with the rise of the 
Shi’i Islamist “Da’wa” movement in the 1970’s that sought a form of 
Islamic rule in Iraq.35 That movement was crushed with unspeakable 
repression in the 1980’s by Saddam Hussein and his ruling, secular, 
Arab national Ba’ath party, after which criticism of the Personal Status 
Code, or any element of Iraqi law or Ba’ath rule, was silenced.36 
Yet the issue of personal status continued to fester and in fact it 
emerged soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, at a time when full 
sovereignty had not even been restored to Iraq. In December of 2003, 
32 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
293, 323 (2010).  
33 Stilt, supra note __ at 752-53. 
34 See id. at 753. 
35 Sluglett, supra note __ at 196-97.  
36 Id. at 200. 
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Shi’i Islamists sought a repeal of the Personal Status Code through the 
enactment of a resolution that replaced it with nothing more than a 
reference to traditional, applicable juristic rules, based on the sect of 
the litigants.37 The resolution was never approved by the United States, 
occupier at the time, and ultimately it was repealed in a raucous session 
that ended in a walkout by the Shi’a Islamist forces.38 But it was a 
harbinger of further events. After all, it was obvious to everyone even 
in the summer of 2003 that the United States would not remain in Iraq 
forever. When it left, Shi’a Islamist political power would be 
considerable given the seeming political predispositions of the masses 
of Iraq’s majority Shi’a population. 
The Shi’a Islamists ultimately used that political clout to include 
the infamous Article 41 in the final Iraq Constitution.39 That article 
contemplates the “freedom” of Iraqis to live by their own rules of 
personal status based on their “religions, sects, beliefs and choices.”40 
It also indicated that this freedom is to be “organized by law,” as 
indeed it would have to be in order to make any sense at all.41 The draft 
Ja’fari Personal Status Code purports to be nothing more than the 
organizing law called for under Article 41 for Iraq’s majority Shi’a 
population.42 
37 Stilt, supra note __ at 751. 
38 LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 172 (2005). 
39 See Ashley S. Deeks and Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting 
History, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 21 (2007). 
40 Hamoudi, supra note __ at 102. 
41 If there is to be any law respecting personal status, then that law will inevitably 
restrict the “beliefs and choices” of some people. Hence, the best way to read Article 
41 is as being a law that permits, indeed even endorses, family law pluralism, but 
leaves it to the legislature to determine the precise contours of that pluralism. Id. The 
Federal Supreme Court of Iraq has effectively adopted that interpretation, refusing 
to replace or reinterpret the existing Personal Status Code in the absence of 
legislative action. Id. at 204-05 (discussing Federal Supreme Court of Iraq Decision 
59 of 2011). 
42 Stipulated Reasons, Ja’fari Personal Status Code (Iraq) (draft 2013) 
[hereinafter “Draft Ja’fari Code”] (on file with author). It should be noted that copies 
of the draft Code were widely disseminated throughout Iraq in the early part of 2014, 
                                                     
14 DRAFT—Errors and Omissions possible. Do not cite without author’s 
permission. 
To summarize, the articulated demand for a specifically Shi’i 
Personal Status Code was one that insisted on the precise replication 
of juristic rules. It neither accepted amalgamation of juristic rules of 
different sects to create a uniform code, nor did it contemplate that the 
legislature could somehow modify, qualify, reform or restructure 
juristic rules in any meaningful fashion in the area of personal status 
to realize broader public interest values. Whether these approaches, or 
others, could be justified in a modern state under any Islamic 
constitutional theory is a rich and deserving subject of debate 
elsewhere in the academic literature.43 It is also entirely irrelevant in 
this particular context of personal status and Shi’ism, where the 
persistent demand has been, as we have seen, the precise, narrow and 
strict replication of juristic rules. 
and some remain available on the Internet. See, e.g., 
http://almasalah.com/ar/News/18949/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9
%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B5-
%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-
%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-  
(last checked February 4, 2015). 
43 This has been the subject of some discussion in academic literature. Clark 
Lombardi, for example, describes various types of lawmaking in the modern Muslim 
world which relies on conceptions far broader than the mere replication of juristic 
rules. CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE 
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI'A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 78-100 
(2006). Mohammed Fadel makes the argument that the classical Sunni Islamic state 
did broadly validate and legitimate lawmaking in a fashion that was independent of 
juristic rulemaking. Mohammad Fadel, A Tragedy of Politics or Apolitical Tragedy, 
31 J. AM. ORIENT. SOC. 109, 118-23 (2011). Asifa Quraishi has similarly taken the 
position that the traditional Islamic state operated on a principle of the separation of 
powers that gave it broad authority to develop its own law, even as the jurists 
separately derived rules from sacred text independent of state authority. Asifa 
Quraishi, Separation of Powers from the Perspective of Islamic Tradition, 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND 
CONTINUITY 63, 63-65 (Tilmann Roder, Rainer Grote & Katrin Geenen, eds. 2011). 
Cf. WAEL HALLAQ, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE 1-3; 10-14 (2013) (arguing that the 
modern state and its methods of rulemaking are incompatible with the Islamic legal 
and political tradition). 
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To be clear, this sort of narrow reconstruction of juristic rules into 
the stuff of modern legislation is not an easy task. Jurists write their 
rules in a fashion that is designed to enable the believer to live a good 
and righteous life, while legislation serves a different social purpose 
altogether.44 Hence, for example, some thought would need to be given 
to precisely what to do with a religious rule that “recommended” but 
did not “require” particular conduct on the part of a believer, or how 
to treat the substantial number of Shi’i rules that are described as 
“precautionary,” meaning there is some doubt as to the permissibility 
of a given action and thus it is better to avoid it rather than risk falling 
into sin.45 Yet even if the project would be technically quite difficult, 
it is conceptually rather straightforward. The aim should be to give life 
to the religious rules, and at the very least not to deviate from them in 
order to serve some other political or ideological end. That this did not 
come to pass when legislation finally appeared is therefore a matter of 
some significance. 
B. The Emergence of the Ja’fari Personal Status Code of 2014 
On February 26, 2014, an image appeared across traditional and 
social media outlets throughout Iraq, one which quickly went viral led 
to an intense debate.46 The photograph was of the Minister of Justice 
at the time, Hassan Shammari, of the Shi’a Islamist Fadila party, 
44 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Understanding the Conflicts and Limitations of Iraq's 
Draft Personal Status Law, JURIST – Forum (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://jurist.org/forum/2014/03/haider-hamoudi-personal-status.php. 
45 Id. For an example of a precautionary rule, see Section III.C infra concerning 
the ability of a child, upon reaching puberty, to disavow a marriage contracted for 
that child by a father or grandfather. 
46 The image remains on the internet in various locations. See, e.g., 
http://www.klawat.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20140227-210642.jpg The 
intensity of the debate ultimately led to demonstrations of substantial numbers of 
women in Baghdad’s streets for a period lasting four days around International 
Women’s Day on March 8, all of whom were wearing black to show opposition to 
the draft. Afraj Shawqi, Iraqi Women Wear Black on Women’s Day in Opposition to 
the New Personal Status Law, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, March 9, 2014, available at 
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=764106&issueno=12885#.
VNJz8p3F-X4. 
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stuffing a rolled up document dozens of pages long into the gilded 
latticework that surrounded the tomb of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, the 
person to whom Prophet Mohammad was closest and his designated 
successor, according to the Shi’a.47 The document in question was the 
Ja’fari Personal Status Code, making its first public appearance, albeit 
in a manner that obscured its content. His back to the camera, 
Shammari gave the appearance of a devoted and determined man 
piously doing his duty to God and nation alike. The depositing of the 
law in the tomb of Ali could almost be seen, in this light, as the 
penultimate act of devotion, to be followed only by enactment of the 
law itself. Finally, in the land where the body of Muhammad’s rightful 
successor lay buried, God’s Law would reign. 
A cynic, of course, might take a different view. The law Shammari 
took such pains to advertise in this manner hardly spoke to Iraq’s 
pressing problems. In fact, if anything, it exacerbated them.48 Other 
problems soon came to light. The draft was atrociously drafted as a 
technical matter.49 Among other things, internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies proliferated,50 certain phrasings seemed impossibly 
47 MOOJAN MOMEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHI’I ISLAM: THE HISTORY AND 
DOCTRINES OF TWELVER SHI’ISM 14-15 (1987). 
48 There is a broad consensus that one of Iraq’s core problems at the time of the 
promulgation of the Ja’fari Personal Status Code, and one that helped lead to the rise 
of the extremist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), was the 
high degree of sectarian tension that existed between the majority Shi’a population 
and the minority Sunni one. See, e.g., Kirk H. Sowell, Iraq’s Second Sunni 
Insurgency, HUDSON INSTITUTE (August 9, 2014), available at 
http://www.hudson.org/research/10505-iraq-s-second-sunni-insurgency. It is hard to 
see how the replacement of a national law with a series of laws that applied to 
individuals on the basis of their sect could possibly ameliorate that problem.  
49 Hamoudi, supra note __ [Jurist article]. 
50 Hence, Article 87 describes “fraud” in procuring a marriage in the following 
manner: 
Fraud is a characterization of a woman to a man in desire for marriage that 
she is free of a fault with knowledge of its presence, or silence about its 
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vague and virtually impossible of rational adjudication,51 and several 
words were often used to denote the same concept.52  
appearance with knowledge of it, such that the man is deceived because of 
it and proceeds to marriage. 
Article 90 then indicates that “. . . fraud is not realized simply by the silence of 
from the woman or her guardian.” This leaves one entirely confused as to whether 
silence over a “fault” (such as insanity, leprosy or other illness that permits a husband 
to invalidate a marriage) in fact constitutes fraud. This is but one of many examples. 
51 The definition of puberty for males is the attainment of fifteen years or earlier 
“if one of the bodily signs depended on by the Muslim jurists appears.” Draft Ja’fari 
Code, Article 16(1). Grand Ayatollah Sistani describes this in more detail detail in 
his own juristic compendium: 
1069: The signs of puberty . . . for a male are one of three: 
First, The appearance of rough hair on the pubic region, irrespective of 
whether it is thick or thin. 
Second, the ejaculation of semen, whether it is ejaculated awake or in sleep, 
in sex or a dream or otherwise. 
Third, the completion of fifteen years . . . . 
2 ALI AL-SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN, 2:¶1069 (2008). These are the repetition of 
long standing rules centuries old and must therefore be that to which the Code refers 
in its description of the “jurists of the Muslims.” See, e.g., MUHAMMAD HASAN AL-
NAJAFI, 26 JAWAHIR AL-KALAM FI SHARH SHARA’I AL-ISLAM 5-6 (Abbas al-Quchani 
ed. 1981)(ca. 1841)[hereinafter JAWAHIR]. The idea that Iraqi judges would 
adjudicate if a male had reached the legal age of adulthood for personal status 
purposes based on the appearance of pubic hair, or the onset of masturbation or wet 
dreams, is too ridiculous to contemplate. 
Other highly ambiguous phrases appear as well, for example a clause entitling a 
person to will their property to a non-Muslim except if “the will is characterized as 
aid to the oppressors, or something similar, in which case it is not sound.” Draft 
Ja’fari Code, Art. 32. 
52 Articles 81 and 82, for example, use two different terms to refer precisely to 
the same concept. Article 81 indicates that if a marriage is invalidated after “entry” 
(the prevalent, if crude, legal term to refer to vaginal sexual intercourse), then a 
woman is entitled to the full dower for which she has contracted. Draft Ja’fari Code, 
art. 81. Article 82 indicates that a marriage cannot be invalidated because of a 
problem with a wife (for example, her insanity) to the extent it occurs after the 
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Why then rush such a plainly unsatisfactory, almost amateurish, 
draft in the early part of 2014 to satisfy a demand that had stood 
unfulfilled for decades? Why not take more time to produce a more 
careful and technically satisfactory product? The reason is obvious, 
and common enough in any contemporary democratic state. National 
elections were only weeks away when Shammari introduced the draft 
Code.53 Shammari belonged to one Shi’i Islamist party, the Fadhila.54 
He was therefore obviously soliciting votes among the Shi’a faithful. 
The aim was not to entice them from voting for a Sunni dominated list 
or even a multisect one, there being no realistic danger of either of 
these happening in large numbers. Rather it was to ensure that they 
supported Fadhila over the other conservative Shi’i Islamist lists, 
among them the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 
(formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution 
in Iraq), and the Da’wa party, since renamed the Coalition for the State 
of Law and under the leadership of then Prime Minister Nouri al-
Maliki.55 The draft was a play, that is, for the votes of a very large Shi’i 
conservative base, upon whose support the premiership of the state 
hinged.56 The entire method of unveiling the law, at the tomb of Shi’i 
Islam’s most revered figure after the Prophet Muhammad himself, then 
looked less like an act of devotion from a believer and instead took on 
the air of a meretricious publicity stunt.  
marriage contract is signed, irrespective of whether this is before “intercourse” 
(wata’ in Arabic) or after it. Draft Ja’fari Code, art. 82.  
53 National elections were held in Iraq at the end of April of 2014. Sowell, supra 
note __. 
54 ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 439 (2007) (describing Fadhila as 
one of the six major Shi’i Islamist parties in Iraq). 
55 See id.; Hamoudi, supra note __ at 46 (describing the main Shi’i Islamist 
parties in Iraq). 
56 These different Shi’i Islamist parties find themselves vying with each other 
for the support of the same Shi’i devout constituency quite frequently. For an 
example of similar competition in 2009, see Hamoudi, supra note __ at 177-79. 
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Nevertheless, it became nearly impossible for the other Islamist 
parties to resist joining in support of the draft. Whatever misgivings 
they might have had about a horribly drafted law and the vulgar 
manner in which it was unveiled paled in comparison to the fear that 
they might be viewed by the base for which they were competing for 
votes as somehow “secular” or at least insufficiently committed to the 
substance of Shi’i Islam. Or at least so it seemed by virtue of the fact 
that the cabinet endorsed the draft and sent it to the legislature for a 
vote in late February. 56 F57  
Events, however, soon derailed the project. First, there was the fact 
that one of the four Grand Ayatollahs of Najaf, Bashir al-Najafi, 
denounced the draft Code for its many flaws a day after it had been 
approved by the Cabinet.58 Soon thereafter, the extremist group known 
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) took control of a number 
of Iraqi cities as the Iraqi army collapsed and fled.59 The nation 
plunged ever deeper into political crisis, ultimately leading to the 
national legislature’s selection of a new prime minister.60 The Ja’fari 
Personal Status Code was soon forgotten. 
It is important, however, not to disregard the importance of the 
draft Code. For one thing, its failure in one term hardly means 
something like it will never find its way into law. After all, the bill was 
presented for a legislative vote after one Shi’i Islamist party wrote it 
in some haste to demonstrate its religiosity, and its closest competitors 
felt obligated to endorse it. Given this, it is not inconceivable by any 
57 Haifa Zangana, Ja’fari law takes the Iraqi government’s violation of women’s 
rights to a new level, THE GUARDIAN, (March 14, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/14/jafari-law-iraqi-
violation-women-rights-marital-rape. 
58 Hamoudi, supra note __ (indicating that Najafi described the Code in rather 
harsh terms as “rife with flights of fancy in legal and juristic formulations that render 
it impossible that a jurist would find it acceptable.”) 
59 Iraq at a Crossroads: Options for U.S. Policy: Hearing before the S. Comm. 
On Foreign Relations, July 24, 2014 (statement of Brett McGurk, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran). 
60 Taylor, supra note __ (respecting the election of al-Abadi as Prime Minister). 
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means that similar steps are taken by one party or another in a manner 
that effectively forces a positive vote on the legislation, in particular if 
parts of it are fixed in a manner that will meet with Najaf’s approval.  
But more relevant for the purposes of this Article, even without its 
enactment, the atrocious state of the draft is quite useful to demonstrate 
the stark tensions between the two competing forces that led to its 
creation. The first of these forces was the decades long desire for the 
personal status law to reflect Shi’i juristic rules for the Shi’i 
population. The second was the practical, ideological predispositions 
of the socially conservative Shi’i “base” whom the competing parties 
were courting in promulgating (in the case of Fadhila) and endorsing 
(in the case of the other Shi’i Islamist parties) the draft legislation.  
Seen in this light, the hasty and awkward draft Code is quite worthy 
of study. If there is to be a second attempt at such a Code, then it will 
likely prove to be more carefully prepared. Having had the experience 
of this initial draft Code, the authors of a new draft will probably 
recognize the tensions between religious rules and conservative 
expectations and manage them with more subtlety, thereby potentially 
disguising the important distinctions between the two. With the haste, 
and the imprecision, the mask fell off. The awkward draft makes 
absolutely clear that what the drafters are endorsing is not in fact the 
realization of any sort of juristic rulemaking but rather a socially 
conservative vision of society endorsed by tribes and rural notables 
with only casual resemblance to the version of Islam promulgated by 
the jurists. The balance of the Article demonstrates how this is so.  
II. Distorting the Doctrine and Managing the Divide: Marriage 
and the Draft Ja’fari Code 
A. Marriage in Islamic Law 
Of all of the traditionalist rules contained within the broad rubric 
of the shari’a, few present as many problems in modernity as those 
concerning marriage. The discrepancy with modern expectations, 
liberal and conservative, begins with the very purpose of marriage. 
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Within both Shi’i and Sunni traditions, this purpose was to render sex 
licit, and the primary motivation to do that is sexual enjoyment.61  
Thus, focusing for the purposes of this Article on the Shi’i tradition 
(though noting that the Sunni rules are not markedly different),62 a 
man’s primary obligations are to pay his wife in two forms. The first 
is a dower agreed upon between the parties at the time that the contract 
for marriage is concluded, which can be virtually anything of value.63 
If they fail to make an agreement on the dower to be given to the wife 
in exchange for the marriage, the contract is valid, and a “dower of 
equivalence” is imposed. This is calculated by comparing the bride to 
a woman of similar station and similar characteristics in matters such 
as youth, virginity, intelligence, morals, elegance and honor.64  
The payment terms are, moreover, tied rather closely to sexual 
intercourse. Specifically, a husband need only pay half of the dower if 
he divorces his wife before he has sex with her.65 Should he fail to pay 
the part of the dower due when the contract is signed,66 the woman 
may refuse sexual intercourse until he does.67 The connection of the 
dower to sexual intercourse is even clearer in the circumstances where 
dower is due in the absence of a marriage. Hence, if a man rapes a 
virgin, or otherwise causes the tearing of her hymen without her 
61 See Tucker, supra note __ at 41. 
62 A competent review of the traditional Sunni juristic rules comparable to those 
discussed in the main text with respect to Shi’ism is contained in Tucker, supra note 
__ at 41-59. Because the focus of the Article is on the Ja’fari draft Personal Status 
Code, which purports to be the realization of Shi’i rules applied exclusively to Iraq’s 
Shi’a, I do not discuss Sunni conceptions of marriage in very much depth. 
63 See, e.g., Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶287. JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:3-4. 
(relating a story wherein the Prophet Muhammad suggested a dower involving an 
indigent husband teaching his wife a verse of the Qur’an).  
64 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶¶294-95; JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:49, 52. 
65 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶306; JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:80. 
66 The dower can be paid in full at the time of contract, or some or all of it can 
be deferred to a later date. Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶302.  
67 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:41.  
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consent, he must pay the dower of equivalence for a virgin.68 Earlier 
jurists create an entire category referred to as the “losing of the vulva” 
where dower would be due from a third party if that third party made 
it impossible for a husband to have sex with his wife again.69  
Examples would include a circumstance where a father had sex with 
his son’s wife, thereby preventing the son under long standing shari’a 
rules from having sex with her again.70 
The other significant financial obligation of the husband to his wife 
is to provide for his wife in the form of shelter, clothing, and food, at 
a standard to which a woman of her station would be accustomed.71 
Sistani describes ancillary obligations as well. For example, a man 
cannot “oppress” his wife, or even verbally assault her, and if he 
intends to leave her, he should divorce her rather than leave her 
“hanging”, neither married nor divorced.72  
68 Id. at ¶319; ABDUL MAJID AL-KHU’I, 2 MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN ¶1351 (1992); 
MUHAMMAD SAEED AL-HAKIM, 3 MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN ¶161, available at 
http://alhakeem.com/arabic/pages/book.php?bcc=1485&itg=1&bi=56&s=ct  
69 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:2. 
70 Id. 
71 Khu’i, supra note __ at p. 287; JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:330 
72 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶240. Other jurists do not categorize these 
specifically as a wife’s rights in marriage, though analogous provisions appear. For 
example, earlier texts contain passages that enable a wife to petition a judge under 
circumstances where a husband has left her but not divorced her in order to obtain 
financial support from her husband’s resources. JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:353-
54. This is not, however, described so much as a wife’s right, but rather a means for 
a wife to ensure that her husband fulfills his obligation. Indeed it appears within a 
broader section outlining the parallel obligations of support on the part of the 
husband, and enablement on the part of the wife. Sistani’s recategorization of this as 
a wife’s “right” recalls Robert Cover’s invaluable insight that Western secular 
society often adopts the discourse of rights where religious law (and in his specific 
instance, Jewish law) prefers the language of “obligations.” Robert M. Cover, A 
Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. L. & REL. 65, 65 (1987). I might only 
add that even the most traditionalist of contemporary authorities in Shi’i Islam have 
been influenced enough by post enlightenment secular trends as to recast religious 
law in the discourse of rights as well. 
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In return, a woman’s primary obligation is summarized through the 
frequent use of a single word—tamkeen, roughly translated as 
“enablement.”73 Specifically, a woman’s obligation is to “enable” her 
husband to enjoy her body at a time and place of his choosing, with 
very limited exceptions.74 Her ancillary obligation is not to leave the 
marital home without his permission, as this plainly interferes with a 
husband’s right to enjoy his wife’s body at a time and place of his 
choosing.75 A wife’s failure to uphold her obligations entitles her 
husband to deny her maintenance because of her “rebelliousness”.76 In 
addition to denying her support, a husband may discipline a rebellious 
wife by verbally chastising her.77 If that fails, he may leave her 
bedside.78 If this does not work to prevent her rebelliousness, then he 
may beat her to the minimum extent necessary to achieve her 
obedience, with the purpose of conciliation and not revenge, so long 
as the beating is not so severe as to cause bruising or bleeding.79 If the 
73 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:303 
74 Id. at 303 (“when she enables him . . . such that she assigns neither a place nor 
a time for which his enjoyment is permitted for them, then he must support her, and 
if she does not, then he has no obligation.”); Sistani, supra note __ at ¶337 (“the right 
of a husband against his wife is that she enable him to near her, and otherwise [enable 
him] for the enjoyments established for him as the [marriage] contract requires, at 
any time he wishes, and that she does not prevent him except for a legitimate reason. 
. . . “) As Sistani’s text indicates, a woman can deny her husband sex in certain, 
limited circumstances. For example, she has no obligation to “enable” him when she 
is sick. JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:312. Similarly, in keeping with the Prophet 
Muhamad’s statement that “there is no obedience to a created that involves 
disobedience to the Creator,” a woman’s performance of obligatory fasting, prayer 
or pilgrimage frees her of her enablement obligation while performing those 
obligations. The same is not true, however, for religious observances that are not 
obligatory, but merely recommended or permitted. JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 
31:314. 
75 Sistani, supra note __ at ¶337; JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:314.  
76 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:314. 
77 Sistani, supra note at ¶353. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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beating exceeds these bounds, then he must pay damages for the injury 
incurred.80  
Historic juristic texts, Sunni and Shi’i, had little trouble explaining 
much of this through an explicit comparison to sale.81 To quote one of 
the most influential Shi’i juristic compendia: 
As is explained in the book of sale, the essence [of sale] is as a name 
for the transfer of possession, not for the contract and not for the 
process of transferring it. We said that what is uniform in all of its 
uses is the actual oral expression in the contract offer. . . . So what is 
desired from “I sell” as an offer is not “I contracted” nor even the 
delivery, but the transfer of possession. This all applies in the oral 
expression “I marry” as an offer, as the desire in the contract would 
be debauchery, and sex, so there is nothing left but the transfer of the 
possession of the vulva, the exercise of power over it, and the settled 
establishment of that power, and that is what is desired in a 
marriage, as with sale, conciliation, lease and other [contracts].82 
In other words, what constitutes a legitimate sale is not the contract 
itself, or the process of delivering the item sold, but in fact the actual 
transfer of possession. Similarly, an offer for marriage does not 
constitute a marriage, nor does the process of conveying a desire for 
sex, as this is merely debauchery. Rather, it is the transfer of possession 
of the wife’s vulva, and the exercise by the husband of his power over 
the vulva, which renders it a legitimate contract for marriage. Hence 
the woman is the seller, and she offers her body, and the man is the 
purchaser, who concludes the contract when he takes possession of it. 
80 Id. The rules as cited in the main text concerning wife beating are those of 
Sistani. Other jurists do not delve into this level of detail respecting the limitations 
of a husband’s physical discipline. Khu’i, for example, only indicates that in the case 
of rebelliousness, if admonishment and leaving the bedside do not succeed, then a 
husband “may strike his wife without causing bruising or the breaking of bones.” 
Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1365. 
81 See ALI, supra note __ at 6. 
82 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:7 (emphasis supplied). 
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The balance of the rules set forth above then fall into place. 
Naturally, a dower must be due to a raped virgin, as that which she had 
the right to sell has been taken.83 Similarly, it must be that a woman 
cannot deny a man sexual intercourse at a time and place of his 
choosing—he has purchased her genitalia, after all, and she can no 
more deny him access to his purchase than one who sells a horse can 
deny its new owner use of it.84  
It should be beyond obvious that devout, Muslim liberals would 
find these traditionalist rules offensive in the extreme and moreover 
regard them as the result of a patriarchal reading of sacred text rather 
than some sort of necessary interpretation of it.85 However, even 
Muslim social conservatives are troubled by some of the more obvious 
commercial implications. Their imagination of marriage includes a 
wife’s sexual obedience, but it also involves almost Victorian ideals of 
child rearing and homemaking as well.86 This is certainly not part of 
the marital bargain in the juristic texts.87 This to say nothing of love 
and intimacy, which is very much part of the Muslim conception of 
marriage in our times, among liberals and conservatives alike, but not 
contemplated by the juristic rules. The Qur’anic verse most commonly 
cited by imams and clerics in modern Muslim weddings comes from 
the Chapter of Rome, referring to the mercy and tenderness that God 
puts between spouses.88 The juristic references to sale of a vulva hardly 
seem consonant with this part of Islam’s Holy Book. 
83 See note __ supra and accompanying text. 
84 See note __ supra and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., Wadud, supra note __ at 2-3 (indicating that historic interpretations 
of the Qur’an were almost always undertaken by men, and that this has affected 
contemporary understandings of it). 
86 Ali, supra note __ at 6.  
87 Sistani, for example, makes clear that a husband cannot obligate his wife to 
perform household chores, nor is she derelict in her marital obligations for failing to 
do them, even if her voluntary performance of them is religiously recommended. 
Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶340. 
88 Qur’an 30:21 (Yusuf Ali trans. 1934) (“And among His Signs is this, that He 
created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquillity with 
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Conservative discomfort might well explain why contemporary 
jurists, while not altering the substantive rules, have also not attempted 
to explain their origins or justify them through sale analogies in their 
compendia. A fascinating example lies in the explanation respecting a 
wife’s right to deny her husband sex until she receives her dower. The 
Jawahir, relying upon the sale analogy common in Shi’i texts before 
the twentieth century, explains this as follows: 
She may refuse sex and the surrendering of her body until she 
receives her dower by agreement, and the same is true for lifting her 
veil and other matters. This is because the marriage with the dower 
is compensation for [those actions]. She is not alone using these 
appropriate means. Every party to be compensated may refuse to 
surrender until they receive the compensation. Based on the report 
of Zur’a bin Sama’a, “I asked him about a man who married a 
maiden and enjoyed her then she rendered him free of his dower. 
May he have intercourse with her before he gives her anything? He 
said, ‘Yes. If she rendered him free, then she has taken the dower 
from him.’” But for embarrassment, difficulty, harm, or oppression, 
she should not deny him, because the vulva is compensation by 
consensus, and the marriage is compensation first. Based on plentiful 
texts [i.e. original source material], what the husband gives her 
enables him to have sex with her, and makes her vagina permissible 
to him.89 
Hence, the Jawahir tells us, a woman who has not received her 
dower can of course deny sex, just like any seller who has not received 
his advance payment for the item he is selling may refuse to surrender 
the item sold. Once payment is given, however, the woman must 
tender her body, as it is now his to possess, and cannot deny him 
because of embarrassment, difficulty, or even harm.  
By contrast, Sistani’s analogous rule appears in far more cursory 
form as follows: 
them, and He has put love and mercy between your (hearts): verily in that are Signs 
for those who reflect.”) 
89 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:41. 
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If a dower is immediate, then the wife may refuse enablement before 
she takes it, irrespective of whether the husband was capable of 
delivering it or not. But if she enables him of her, then she cannot 
deny him after that until she receives it.90 
The rule is largely similar, entitling a woman to deny sex before 
she receives her dower, but not entitling her to do so once she has 
already consented to sex. Yet the bases for the rule have disappeared, 
thereby allowing modern clerics to describe the dower more as a gift 
that a husband must give to his wife, the Islamic equivalent of the 
contemporary diamond ring.91 It is also often described as protection 
against an arbitrary divorce by a husband, given that it is after all her 
property.92 The problem of course is that this is rather difficult to 
reconcile with a fair number of the rules described above. It would be 
odd to demand the return of half of the value of a diamond ring if there 
had been no sex prior to the dissolution of the marriage. It would be 
odder still to obligate the rapist of a virgin to give his victim a gift, and 
of course the idea of insurance against divorce in such an instance is 
rendered entirely incoherent.  
90 Sistani, supra note __ at ¶306. There is a slight yet potentially significant 
difference, in that the Jawahir suggests that the dower is constructively paid by a 
woman who consents to sex, while Sistani does not intimate this, indicating only that 
the woman may no longer refuse sex pending receipt of the dower. In the interests 
of space, I do not address this distinction herein. 
91 See, e.g., Sayyid Moustafa al-Qazwini, A New Perspective: Women in Islam, 
Chapter 3: Divorce, Divorce and Mahr, Proprietorship, AL-ISLAM.ORG, AHLUL 
BAYT DIGITAL ISLAMIC LIBRARY PROJECT, http://www.al-islam.org/a-new-
perspective-women-islam-fatma-saleh-moustafa-al-qazwini/chapter-3-divorce-
divorce-and-mahr#divorce-and-mahr (“The [dower] is a gift to the wife irrespective 
whether of the marriage continues or later dissolves. If the husband has not paid the 
[dower] in full, then he will still be held liable for the remaining balance, despite the 
reasons for divorce.”) Sayyid Qazwini is one of the most well known and widely 
followed Shi’i clerics in the United States. He is the founding Imam of the Islamic 
Educational Center of Orange County, California. Sayyid Moustafa al-Qazwini, 
About the Authors, AL-ISLAM.ORG, AHLUL BAYT DIGITAL ISLAMIC LIBRARY 
PROJECT, http://www.al-islam.org/a-new-perspective-women-islam-fatma-saleh-
moustafa-al-qazwini/chapter-3-divorce-divorce-and-mahr#divorce-and-mahr. 
92 See id. 
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In any event, given the helpful mask on the origins of the doctrines 
supplied by the likes of Sistani, and supported by the discourse of 
contemporary lower level clerics and imams, the fiction respecting the 
purposes of marriage and its attendant rules within the historic 
tradition becomes plausible enough to render the matter more 
appealing to Muslim social conservatives. As such, it is unsurprising 
that for the most part, the draft Code repeats the juristic rules in large 
part on the matters described in this section.  
Hence, Articles 101-02 of the draft Code reads as follows: 
Article 101. The right of the husband over his wife are two matters-
- 
(1) that he she enables him to near her for the enjoyments 
established for him in accordance with the contract at any 
time that he wishes, that she does not prevent him except for 
a legitimate reason, and that she does not take any action that 
denies his right of enjoyment 
(2) that she does not leave the marital home except with his 
permission. 
Article 102. The right of the wife over the husband is limited to the 
following: 
(1) that he spent on her for her good, her shelter and all that she 
needs based on her station 
(2) that he does not hurt or oppress her, nor quarrel with her 
without a legitimate reason 
(3) That he does not abstain from her entirely, and render her 
hanging, neither married nor divorced 
(4) That he does not leave from near her for more than four 
months, and if the wife cannot be patient for four months, 
then the husband must come nearer before the four months, 
or divorce her and free her path.93 
93 Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note __ at arts. 101-02. 
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Similarly, the rules on dower indicate that a woman has the right 
to the dower set by the contract.94 If none is named, then a dower of 
equivalence is imposed.95 The imposition of a dower of equivalence is 
also imposed on rapists, though the draft Code seems not to distinguish 
between the rape of virgins and nonvirgins in the manner that the 
juristic texts do.96  
Of course, it is precisely rules such as these that led to the outcry 
against the draft law by liberal and secular forces.97 Yet that did not 
matter at all to the drafters of the Ja’fari Code, who could count on the 
opposition of those secular and liberal forces to their law no matter 
how it was framed. What was important to the drafters was that the 
rules align well with the expectations and predispositions of 
conservatives whom they were courting. This they certainly do. If most 
of the bedrock supporters of a draft Ja’fari Code also allowed for such 
elements as companionship and intimacy to play a role in marriage as 
well, they might not be expected to insist on the recognition of such 
matters in legislation. So long as the references to sale remained 
implicit, and marriage could be framed as much greater than the 
bartering over sexual access, the devout could be satisfied by the 
traditional formulations. In the end, then, mirroring Sistani’s rules 
worked to satisfy the constituencies who might be expected to support 
the bill. This proved not to be the case with other, important aspects of 
marriage, however, as further described below. 
B. The Temporary Marriage 
94 Id. at art. 91 
95 Id. at art. 92 
96 Id. at 91. This might very well be another area where the drafters changed the 
juristic rules in order to meet Muslim social conservative expectations. I do not 
discuss it, however, because it is possible that this is merely the result of shoddy 
work and inattention to detail. It is not obvious that social conservatives would 
necessarily have strongly held views on the specific rules regarding rape and dower. 
This is not true of the other matters discussed in the balance of the Article, where the 
decision to derogate from the rules is perfectly obvious. 
97 See, e.g., Shawqi, supra note __ (describing days long demonstrations against 
the law); Zangana, supra note __ (offering extensive criticisms of the law). 
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A modern problem concerning the historic analogy between 
marriage and sale, generally safely suppressed, arises solely within 
Shi’ism because of a curious additional form of marriage. This is the 
temporary, or pleasure, marriage.98 Where Shi’i jurists historically 
would analogize marriage to sale, as described in the previous section, 
they analogize the temporary marriage to lease, with the dower the 
necessary compensation for the lease.99 The Jawahir explains the 
distinction as follows: 
The dower is a special condition of the temporary marriage, and the 
contract is void without it, without disagreement and indeed by 
consensus. It is the basis [for it] based on the statement [of Shi’a 
Islam’s Sixth Imam] ‘there is no temporary marriage, without two 
matters. A set time, and a set rent.’ . .. And in other report, ‘the 
women are leased,’ as with the statement [of the Fifth Imam] ‘she is 
leased.’ From this the difference is known between the permanent, 
with whom one wishes offspring and the like, and the temporary, 
from whom one desires usufruct and pleasure and the like, as a result 
of which it resembles a lease, and thus the dower is compensation 
for the lease and a condition for its validity.100 
The wife must, moreover, “enable” her husband precisely as in an 
ordinary marriage in exchange for the dower, and partial enablement 
leads to a reduction in the dower, as described below. 
Thus, it is obligatory to pay the dower required in the contract . . . as 
the dower earned, but it is settled upon intercourse and her 
fulfillment of enablement during the period [of the marriage]. . . . [A 
man said] to the Sixth Imam, “I married a woman for a month, and 
she wants the entire dower, but I fear she will stay away from me. 
He said ‘it is not permitted to hoard that which she has power over, 
98 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 30:139-49 (describing the differences between the 
Sunni and Shi’i positions on the temporary marriage at some length in a polemical 
fashion).  
99 Id. at 30:162. 
100 Id. 
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but if she does stay away from you, then take back [the dower] in the 
amount that she has stayed away.” 101 
Unsurprisingly, as with permanent marriage, the explicit 
references to leasing the genitalia of women have disappeared from 
the discourse of modern jurists. Hence, Sistani summarizes the same 
rules set forth above without that analogy as follows: 
Marriage is a contract between a man and a woman, pursuant to 
which each of them is permissible to the other. It is of two types: 
permanent and temporary. The permanent contract is one where the 
duration of the marriage is not set, and the wife is called she who is 
permanent. The non-permanent contract is one where a duration is 
set, as an hour, a day, a year, or more or less, and the wife is called 
she who is enjoyed, or temporary. 
It is a condition of the temporary marriage to name the dower. If 
there is a contract without a named dower, intentionally or out of 
ignorance or forgetfulness, it is invalid . . . . . 
She who is enjoyed owns the entire dower of the contract, but it is 
settled entirely on condition that she does not breach her enablement 
set forth for her as a requirement in the contract. If she breaches for 
part of the period, then her husband may take from the dower in 
proportion [of the failure to enable] . . . . 102 
The problem is that unlike permanent marriage, the inherently 
commercial nature of the transaction cannot be disguised in modernity 
as permanent marriage can. A modern traditionalist cleric might be 
able to describe the dower as a “gift” in a permanent marriage, and 
sustain a fiction that indeed it is a gift rather than compensation for sex 
despite rules which strongly suggest otherwise, and despite historic 
texts which very much say otherwise.103 The same principle is simply 
not credible in the case of a marriage that can last as little as an hour, 
or less. Other rules, such as the fact that a husband in a temporary 
101 Id. at 30:164  
102 Sistani, supra note __ at ¶¶30,233, 237. Exceptions lie where intercourse 
would not be permissible, and in particular during the wife’s menstrual period. Id. at 
¶237. 
103 See note __ supra and accompanying text. 
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marriage owes no support to his wife, even if she becomes pregnant 
by him, only help to fortify the conclusion that what is involved in a 
temporary marriage is neither intimacy nor child rearing.104 It surely 
cannot be described even in modernity as anything but the sale of sex 
for money.  
Given all of this, modern developments respecting the temporary 
marriage have usually involved Sunni polemicism and Shi’i 
apologetics. As to the former, having successfully bifurcated the true 
nature of the Islamic marriage contract as set forth by Sunni classical 
jurists from social expectations of the same, Sunni polemics emerged 
that castigated Shi’ism for permitting temporary marriages that were 
at their core entirely about sex. Hence, for example, the leading 
commentator on Iraq’s Personal Status Code, the Sunni Ahmed al-
Kubaisi, indicates that a condition of the marriage is that it be 
permanent, explaining as follows: 
Marriages [that are for a limited duration] contradict the religious 
purpose of marriage, which is a settled life, the permanence of 
intimacy, the establishment of family, the raising of children, the 
assumption of responsibility, the realization of social solidarity, and 
the organization of civilization which results in the building of the 
self and the continuation of life. . . .  
[The temporary marriage] is deemed corrupt in Iraqi courts, and it 
has no consequences of a valid marriage.105  
104 Sistani, supra note __ at ¶256 
105 AHMED AL-KUBAISI, 1 PERSONAL STATUS IN THE FIQH, THE COURTS AND THE 
LAW 70-71 (2d ed. 2007). AS an additional example of these sorts of polemics on the 
internet, see A. Muhammad, Does the Quran Permit Temporary (Mut’ah) 
Marriages, TRUE ISLAM, http://www.quran-
islam.org/articles/part_4/temporary_marriages_(P1437).html (last checked 
February 11, 2015)(“God would never advocate sin, not plain sin nor disguised sin. 
Anyone who writes a temporary marriage certificate for the sake of sexual activities 
is trying to disguise his sin. In fact he would not be any different from someone who 
hires a prostitute for a day or a week for sexual services. The only difference is that 
the first man conjured up a piece of paper and adds the title “marriage” to it! But the 
act, in purpose and execution, is the same.”) 
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As a traditionalist who does not hesitate to express his outrage at 
“innovations” that derogate from the traditional juristic rules, such as 
legal restrictions on polygamy,106 Kubaisi is surely aware of his 
intellectual dishonesty in describing the “religious purpose” of 
marriage in those same texts as relating to intimacy, settling down and 
assuming family duties and responsibilities. Surely, given his 
insistence that other traditional juristic rules be followed without 
reform, the more honest approach would be to describe the Islamic 
juristic rules for what they are—the sale of a vulva for support and a 
dower.107 Yet as we have seen, this recharacterization of the purposes 
of marriage (without simultaneously changing its rules) has been 
dramatically successful in the modern era.108 Indeed, it has been so 
successful that a criticism that medieval Sunni scholars could not have 
possibly had about the temporary marriage is one that a Sunni cleric 
can credibly make as the core Islamic basis to ban temporary 
marriages.  
As for Shi’i Iraqis, they are, of course, aware of the juristic 
permissibility of the temporary marriage, and yet are uncomfortable 
with it. It is a form of marriage that is not engaged in with any 
regularity, and regarded with extreme hostility as a practical matter.109 
The idea that a virgin Iraqi woman of any age would actually be able 
to lease her genitalia for an hour to a man would be something that 
would horrify Iraqi conservative forces, from urban elite to tribal elder. 
Tribal leaders have told me quite directly that they would regard this 
as fornication which merited death, with any questions respecting the 
106 Kubaisi, supra note __ at 110-15. Kubaisi goes so far as to describe some of 
the efforts to ban polygamy as part of a plot to limit the number of Muslims in the 
world. Kubaisi, supra at 111. 
107 See Asifa Quraishi-Landes, A Meditation on Mahr, Modernity and Muslim 
Marriage Contract Law, in FEMINISM, LAW AND RELIGION 178 (M. Failinger, E. 
Schiltz and S. Stabile eds. 2013); see also Ali, supra note __ at 6. 
108 See Ali, supra note __ at 6. 
109 Kubaisi, supra note __ at 7 n.2 (“From a practical standpoint, [the Shi’a], and 
especially those we have in Iraq, do not engage in [temporary marriage] and deem it 
among the contemptible forms of marriage.”) 
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legality of the pleasure marriage waved off with some combination of 
indignation and embarrassment.110  
This creates a problem for the drafters of the Ja’fari Personal Status 
Code. To draft a code without any reference to the pleasure marriage 
would be plainly disregarding a core element of Shi’i marriage 
doctrine, and doing so presumably because the Sunni prohibitions on 
the practice were preferred. This is precisely the type of legislative 
selectivity that the Code is supposed to eradicating, as part of a long 
standing Shi’i demand to permit the Shi’a to live by their own rules of 
personal status.111 Yet to keep it would be to legalize and legitimize a 
practice of which most Shi’a are deeply embarrassed, and which 
Sunnis will use as part of a broader polemical assault on Shi’ism. 
The solution by and large was to dispense with the pleasure 
marriage entirely in the draft Ja’fari Personal Status Code. It is simply 
too far removed from the contemporary Iraqi experience, and regarded 
as too problematic on normative grounds that exist independently of 
juristic texts, to be able to receive due recognition in a draft law. 
Hence, the draft Code’s rules of marriage nowhere suggest that 
marriage might be temporary and nowhere include reference to how 
durations might be set during contracting. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the husband’s obligation to support his wife during a 
marriage is set forth in unconditional terms in Article 102, thereby 
explicitly derogating from the Shi’i rule which has no such support 
110 In the spring of 2013, I spent a great deal of time in Iraq interviewing tribal 
leaders and observing tribal resolution processes with two professors from Basra 
University School of Law, Wasfi al-Sharaa and Aqeel al-Dahan. Most of my time 
was spent among Shi’i tribes located in Baghdad, particularly Sadr City, though 
inevitably members of those tribes had relocated from elsewhere. The fruit of our 
research will appear in Haider Ala Hamoudi, Wasfi Alsharaa and Aqeel al-Dahan, 
The Resolution of Disputes in State and Tribal Law in the South of Iraq: Toward a 
Cooperative Model of Pluralism in NEGOTIATING STATE AND NONSTATE LAW: THE 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL AND LOCAL LEGAL PLURALISM (Helfand ed., forthcoming 
2015) (on file with author). 
111 See Section I.A (describing formal reason for Code being to permit the Shi’a 
to live by their own rules of sect). 
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obligation in a temporary marriage.112 The same is true for other areas 
where the rules for temporary marriage differ from those of permanent 
marriage. In each and every case, the draft Code sets forth rules for 
permanent marriage and does not mention at all the different rules for 
the temporary marriage established in the juristic texts.113 In other 
words, the drafters adopted Sunni rules respecting marriage, a 
remarkable result for a Code whose very purpose was to enable the 
Shi’a not to have to abide by Sunni rules imposed on them.114  
There is one curious exception to this, however. In one, and only 
one, place in the draft Code, there is an implicit reference to the 
pleasure marriage being permissible. This lies in Article 63, which 
reflects the long standing Shi’i juristic rule that a Muslim may not 
marry a non-Muslim.115 This is in contrast to the Sunni rules (and the 
existing Personal Status Code, which adopts Sunni rules on this point), 
which permit a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman, though 
not the reverse, so long as she is what is regarded in Islamic discourse 
as a “Person of the Book”, or broadly the follower of an Abrahamic 
religion.116 
While Shi’ism does not permit marriages outside of Islam 
generally, it does provide an exception for Muslim men engaged in 
112 Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note __ at art. 102 (1) (describing support as the 
right of a wife against her husband.) 
113 For example, the draft Code sets forth specific rules respecting when a man 
may pronounce a unilateral divorce against his wife. Id. at arts. 135-36. Nowhere 
does it suggest that a divorce is not available as against a temporary wife, despite 
this being a clear rule concerning the temporary marriage. See Sistani, supra note __ 
at 3:¶252. Similarly, the waiting period after which a divorced woman may generally 
remarry is set in the Code as three menstrual cycles. Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note 
__ at art. 155(2)(a). This is the rule for the permanent marriage, but a temporary wife 
generally needs to wait only two menstrual cycles. Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶259 
114 See Section I.A (describing formal reason for Code being to permit the Shi’a 
to live by their own rules of sect). 
115 Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note __ at art. 63. 
116 Personal Status Code, supra note __ at art. 17; Kubaisi, supra note __ at 109-
110.  
                                                     
36 DRAFT—Errors and Omissions possible. Do not cite without author’s 
permission. 
temporary, rather than permanent, marriage.117 Interestingly, Article 
63 recognizes this distinction, indicating that “a marriage of a Muslim 
woman to a non-Muslim is not sound as an absolute matter, and the 
permanent marriage of a Muslim man to a woman other than a Muslim, 
or an apostate from the Islamic religion, is not sound as an absolute 
matter.”118 The reference to “permanent” breaks the Code’s general 
approach of disregarding the temporary marriage, given that it 
suggests that there is a type of nonpermanent marriage pursuant to 
which a Muslim man might marry a non-Muslim woman, but not the 
reverse. 
The reason for this is again an attempt to placate potentially 
socially conservative Shi’a who might be expected to support the bill. 
The phenomenon of intermarriage between Iraqi men and foreign 
women was enough to result in the constitution specifically granting 
Iraqi citizenship rights to anyone born to an Iraqi parent, even if the 
other parent was foreign, without objection from Shi’a Islamist 
forces.119 This is unsurprising because among urban elites in 
particular, some not insignificant number of Shi’is have over the past 
several decades married foreigners, not all of whom were Muslims.120 
117 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶232; JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 30:155. 
118 Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note __ at art. 63. (Emphasis supplied).  
119 As has been reported, the constitutional provision did change the existing 
law, and did prove controversial, because it granted citizenship to children of Iraqi 
women and non-Iraqi men. Sara Burhan Abdullah, Citizenship and Women’s Rights 
under the Iraq Constitution, JURIST, Jan. 30. 2010, 
http://jurist.org/dateline/2010/01/iraq-citizenship-and-womens-rights.php However, 
there was broad agreement among all parties—Islamists and secular forces, Shi’a 
and Sunnis—that a child born to an Iraqi man and a non Iraqi woman must be entitled 
to Iraqi citizenship by right, without any sort of restriction imposed respecting the 
religion of the woman in question. See Abdullah, supra. 
120 A well publicized example of this is provided in the case of Margaret Hassan, 
a woman who married a Shi’i Iraqi when he was studying abroad, and then moved 
to Iraq and obtained dual citizenship but never converted to Islam. James Sturcke, 
Iraqi Sentenced to Life in Prison for Murder of Aid Worker Margaret Hassan, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jun/02/margaret-hassan-iraq-murder-
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To declare all such marriages void and those engaged in it as 
fornicators, would be quite problematic, not only for the person 
engaged in the practice, but also for those who work and interact in the 
same social circles. The law would be delegitimizing significant 
numbers of Iraqi marriages, and prohibiting a practice that is likely to 
continue. 
Thus, the reference to permanent marriage in Article 63 was not so 
much to legitimize the pleasure marriage as it was to deal with another 
problem in which juristic rule does not conform to modern, 
conservative social expectation, and this relates to the broad 
acceptability of interreligious marriage among Muslim men and non-
Muslim women. The only real manner in which to permit such 
marriages while still complying with religious dictate was to hint at 
their permissibility through a separate vehicle, the pleasure marriage, 
which carries its own set of problems so severe that it is not referenced 
anywhere else in the Code. The result is something of an incoherence 
obviously, and hardly an accurate reflection of juristic rules.  
C. The Child Marriage 
Curiously, the drafters adopted a very different approach when 
addressing another area of Islamic marriage law with deep roots that 
has proven problematic in modernity. This is the area of child 
marriage. Before describing the Code’s treatment of this highly 
contentious issue, however, it is important to review the historic rules. 
1. Child Marriage in the Traditionalist, Juristic Texts 
a. Age of Majority 
Two relevant sets of rules exist in the traditional juristic 
formulations across the Islamic schools. The first is that the age of 
sentence . When she was kidnapped and murdered in 2004 by a Sunni extremist 
organization, there were large demonstrations protesting her death, and substantial 
numbers of Iraqis were outraged. Sturcke, supra. The justice system continued to 
pursue the case, finally convicting someone of the murder in 2009 and sentencing 
him to life in prison. To say the least, it would have been an act of political folly for 
a draft Personal Status Code not to recognize the validity of her marriage, or the 
marriages of others like her. 
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legal majority is far lower under traditional renderings of the shari’a 
than it is in modernity. Describing the rules across schools, Judith 
Tucker indicates that the date ranges from the age of nine to puberty.121 
Rudolph Peters refers to puberty as the relevant age and describes 
minimum and maximum ages before which puberty cannot be 
established and after which it is presumed as a matter of law across the 
schools.122  
The Shi’i texts plainly consider puberty the relevant consideration 
for boys, indicating that first ejaculation or the appearance of pubic 
hair signify puberty.123 They set no minimum age at which this might 
occur but impose a maximum of fifteen years at which a boy is defined 
as an adult as a matter of religious law.124 For girls, however, the age 
the Shi’i jurists set is nine lunar years, entirely independently of 
menstruation or other signs of puberty.125  They further suggest that 
consummation of a marriage upon the attainment of adulthood (or, to 
put the matter more directly, vaginal sexual intercourse with a “bride” 
of eight years and nine months) is permissible.126  This appears to be 
in contrast to Sunni rules, which focus less on legal majority and more 
on “physical sturdiness and appeal to men,” though there is reference 
in Sunni texts to the age of nine as well.127 
121 Ali, supra note __ at 32.  
122 RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 21 (2005). 
123 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 26:5-6; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:179. 
124 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 26:16; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:179. 
125 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 26:38; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:179; Sistani, supra 
note __ at 2:¶1069. This is at slight variance with Peters, who suggests that a girl 
under nine might be deemed an adult upon menstruation. Peters, supra note __ at 21. 
The difference is largely academic, however, as the onset of puberty before the age 
of nine lunar years seems generally unlikely as a matter of fact. 
126 See Jawahir, supra note __ at 29:414; Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8; Khu’i, 
supra note __ at 2:¶1230 (all prohibiting intercourse with a bride under the age of 
nine). 
127 Ali, supra note __ at 76. 
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b. Marriage before Legal Age of Majority 
The second set of rules relating to child marriage is that across the 
Islamic schools, the guardians of those in their legal minority, and in 
particular fathers, long had the power to contract a marriage on their 
behalf.128 This raises two very large, and obvious, concerns, as 
discussed below.  
i. Problems of Consent 
The first concern is that this type of marriage effectively strips 
consent to marry away from the children for whom marriage has been 
contracted. This lies in some contrast to the rules for adults.129 Thus, 
generally speaking, even if a guardian arranged a marriage for an adult 
woman, Tucker reports that most Sunni jurists deemed the consent of 
the bride to be necessary to validate the marriage.130 Admittedly, 
however, they tended to presume consent in a rather broad array of 
circumstances, including the failure of the adult virgin woman to 
object to the marriage contracted for her.131 For her part, Ali appears 
to disagree, and notes that a virgin adult could be contracted into 
marriage without her consent according to both the Maliki and the 
Shafi’i schools of Sunnism, but not the Hanafi.132 There is no real 
debate, however, concerning the marriage of children. Children plainly 
could be contracted into marriage by their adult guardians without their 
consent.133  
The rules set forth by the Shi’i jurists similarly permit a father or 
paternal grandfather to compel a child into marriage as a general 
matter. Some, and most notably Grand Ayatollah Muhsen al-Hakim, 
the primus inter pares of Najaf’s Grand Ayatollahs when Iraq enacted 
its current Personal Status Code in 1959, indicated that contracting a 
128 Tucker, supra note __ at 43. 
129 Id. at 42. 
130 Id.   
131 Id.   
132 Ali, supra note __ at 33-34. 
133 Tucker, supra note __ at 43; Ali, supra note __ at 32. 
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marriage for a minor was permissible, but reprehensible.134 He 
indicated that instead one should rush to marry a girl upon reaching 
the age of adulthood of nine lunar years, on the basis of a report from 
Shi’i Islam’s Third Imam that “it adds to the happiness of a person that 
his daughter does not menstruate in his home.”135 Other twentieth 
century jurists do not describe the child marriage as reprehensible, 
though they also do not indicate the same level of haste respecting the 
marriage of one deemed an adult, either. 
Importantly, the power to contract a marriage on behalf of a child 
is restricted to the father or paternal grandfather, such that if a brother 
or uncle undertakes it, then it requires the permission of the contracted 
parties at adulthood to be deemed valid.136 Similarly, if a father or 
paternal grandfather have a corrupt purpose in undertaking the 
marriage, then the marriage contracted requires the consent of the 
parties at puberty, precisely as if an uncle or brother had contracted 
it.137 The jurists do not define with any level of specificity what they 
mean by a “corrupt purpose,” though presumably it might include such 
matters as contracting a girl into marriage for a lower than normal 
dower in exchange for a personal payment from the husband or his 
family directly to the guardian.138 
134 MUHSEN IBN MAHDI TABATABA’I AL-HAKIM, 14 MUSTAMSIK AL-URWA AL-
WUTHQA 11 (1983). 
135 Id. 
136 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:203, 217; Sistani, supra note __ at 
3:¶57(indicating that the father and grandfather have the power of guardianship as 
concerns marriage), ¶73 (indicating that a marriage contracted by a person other than 
a guardian or an agent depends on the acceptance when the party being married 
consents); Hakim, supra note __ at 14:436-37. 
137 See, e.g., Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1236; Hakim, supra note __ at 14:455-
56. 
138 Shi’i jurists contrast the power of a father or grandfather on the one hand, 
with the power of other guardians on the other, by pointing out that with a father or 
grandfather, the absence of a corrupt purpose is presumed, while in the case of other 
guardians, the presumption is that the marriage is contracted in pursuit of a personal 
interest. This presumption justifies the power of the father or grandfather to compel 
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Moreover, as a matter of precaution, both Hakim and Sistani 
indicate that the father or grandfather must perceive a benefit in the 
marriage, and not merely avoid corruption.139 Hence, Hakim indicates 
that if two people wish to marry his daughter, and he chooses the one 
less honorable, or the one who offers a lower dower, then the marriage 
is not free of doubt.140 Practically, what such doubt means is that there 
is sufficient uncertainty attending such a marriage that it should be 
deemed neither valid nor invalid, but clarified through marriage or 
divorce.141  
A dispute arises, however, as to whether or not the contract is 
binding if there is no determination of a “corrupt purpose” and the 
father or grandfather can claim some sort of benefit in the marriage. In 
other words, if a father contracts his four year old daughter into a 
marriage with a husband who would broadly be deemed suitable, and 
on a dower that falls within social expectations, is the marriage binding 
upon the girl should she seek to disavow it upon reaching adulthood? 
The nineteenth century Jawahir states the contract is absolutely 
binding on the girl and most probably on a boy as well, indicating that 
a girl’s hatred of her contracted husband is not a reason to fail to obey 
her father’s dictate.142 Hakim similarly binds the girl absolutely and 
a marriage that a different guardian could not compel upon the attainment of 
adulthood. See, e.g., JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:197. The rule set forth in the main 
text that a father or grandfather with a corrupt purpose cannot compel the marriage 
when the child is an adult can therefore be seen as merely a logical extension of that 
same rule. That is, where an uncle would be presumed to be contracting his niece 
into marriage for his own personal benefit rather than hers, a father would be 
presumed not to do this as with his own son or daughter. If he were found to be 
engaging in such “corruption”, however, then the marriage he contracts would be 
subject to invalidation by the child upon reaching adulthood, precisely as the contract 
by an uncle would. 
139 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:455-56; Sistani, supra note __ at 3:59. 
140 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:456-57. 
141 Sistani lays out these alternatives in explicit detail. See Sistani, supra note __ 
at 3:¶60. 
142 Jawahir supra note __ at 29:172-73, 182. 
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indicates that the better opinion is that the boy is also bound to a 
contract arranged by a father or grandfather.143  
Sistani takes a narrower view. He indicates that if a father or 
grandfather contract a marriage for a child, male or female, then it is 
valid, presuming a lack of corruption and the existence of a benefit.144 
However, he adds that the validity of the marriage “might depend on 
the establishment of an election for the contracted party after 
adulthood and discernment.”145 If the contracted party disavows the 
marriage contracted when an adult, then sufficient doubt exists as to 
the continuation of the marriage that the contract should be renewed, 
or a divorce pronounced.146 This would give a girl the ability to 
disavow a marriage contracted for her, given that her husband could 
no longer claim the benefits of the marriage until the doubts 
surrounding its validity were resolved.  
ii. Physical Harm 
Beyond the lack of consent, the other significant problem relating 
to the marriage of girls before they reach the age of majority is the 
actual, physical harm done to them by virtue of sexual activity taken 
while they are very small children, or even infants. It is here where the 
rules of traditionalist jurists are the most offensive to liberal 
sensibilities. 
There is broad agreement among Shi’i jurists that a husband cannot 
consummate his marriage to a girl under the age of nine lunar years 
(i.e. a girl who has not reached the technical age of majority).147 The 
specific reason given is the inability of a girl that age to be able to 
143 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:433-34. 
144 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶60. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Jawahir, supra note __ at 29:414; Hakim, supra note __ at 14:78-79; Sistani, 
supra note __ at 3:¶8; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1230. 
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tolerate penetration.148 For this reason, consummation includes both 
anal and vaginal sex, but it does not refer to “enjoyment” other than 
sex.149 To quote Sistani, “there is no problem with . . . touching with 
appetite, kissing, embracing, and thighing.”150 Hakim reaches a largely 
similar conclusion, indicating that such sexual enjoyments are 
available even with a child young enough to be still nursing.151  
The matter becomes somewhat complicated if a husband ignores 
this directive and penetrates his wife before she reaches the age of nine. 
Despite some source text which would suggest such a husband could 
never engage in sexual intercourse with the girl ever again, jurists in 
the modern era have ruled that there are in fact no financial or legal 
consequences to the commission of this sin.152 The exception is if the 
sex causes “ripping”, whose precise definition the jurists dispute, but 
which at its core refers to the combining of the urinal or anal pathways 
with the vaginal.153  
In the case of “ripping” a girl, modern jurists take the position that 
he owes her blood money for the injury caused, whether or not he 
148 Jawahir, supra note __ at 29:415. 
149 Id. at 29:416. 
150 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8. 
151 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:79-80. The final of these so-called enjoyments, 
referred to by Sistani and Hakim alike as “thighing,” is no more a word in Arabic 
than it is in English. It is the creation of a verb from the noun “thigh.” The Grand 
Ayatollahs leave it to the reader’s imagination as to what this refers, though the 
matter seems not terribly difficult to discern.  It is worth noting, however, that 
“thighing” is referenced in the juristic texts elsewhere, primarily in relation to 
homosexual activity that does not involve anal penetration.  See, e.g., JAWAHIR, supra 
note __ at 41:382.  The punishment established for the sin, described as one of the 
hudud by Khu’i, is one hundred lashes.  Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶189; JAWAHIR, 
supra note __ at 41:382. 
152 See JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:417-19 (describing the rule, and the texts 
which support a different conclusion); Hakim, supra note __ at 14:80-82 (describing 
same in text and accompanying footnotes). See also Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8. 
153 See JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:419-21 (describing the definitional issues 
in some detail); Hakim, supra note __ at 14:85-86 (same). See also Sistani, supra 
note __ at 3:¶8. 
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divorces her, despite some earlier disagreement in source texts which 
suggested that no blood money was due if the woman remained 
married to the man.154 The blood money for a free Muslim woman 
would work out to approximately $100,000, not an insignificant sum 
in Iraq.155 If a marriage is consummated after the age of nine and there 
is “ripping”, the modern jurists seem to agree that no blood money is 
due because the girl is in fact an adult.156  
Moreover, the effects of marriage remain forever as to a “ripped” 
wife whether or not the husband divorces her, and whether or not he 
rips her before she reaches nine or afterwards. This means that she is 
entitled to inherit from him as his wife, that he cannot marry her sister 
while she is alive, that he cannot take four wives in addition to her, and 
that, most importantly, he must support her financially.157  
As for intercourse, it is forbidden with a “ripped” wife if the injury 
was caused before the age of nine, at least until the wound heals.158 
Intercourse with a wife “ripped” after the age of nine, however, is 
permissible.159 
2. Child Marriage in the Draft Ja’fari Code 
Liberal and secular forces within Iraq would plainly find such rules 
horrifying in the extreme, even more so than temporary marriage. 
Moreover, where the human rights implications of the consensual 
barter of sexual enjoyment for money as contemplated by the 
154 See JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:422-23(describing the dispute); Hakim, 
supra note __ at 14:83-84 (same). See also Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8. 
155 A fuller description of the blood money and the manner by which it is 
calculated appears in notes __ infra. 
156 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8; JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:422. 
157 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:435-36; Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8; Hakim, 
supra note __ at 14:84,91. 
158 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:83; Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8. 
159 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:88; Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8. 
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temporary marriage are at least ambiguous,160 condemnation of child 
marriage around the globe is broad and deep.161 That liberals had 
powerful global allies on this question might lead one to expect the 
drafters to defer to some extent to liberal expectations. 
However, this law was neither drafted to appeal to Muslim liberals, 
nor human rights activists, nor even the broader international 
community. It sought to appeal to one, and only one, constituency—
Muslim social conservatives in Iraq. As such, the draft Code adopts a 
version of child marriage that in some respects replicates juristic rules, 
but in others departs from them significantly in a manner that renders 
them even less protective of girls than the already problematic juristic 
rules. 
As concerns the age of adulthood, the rules largely replicate 
Sistani. They are buried in the section addressing wills, in what appears 
to be a clumsy and amateurish attempt to make them more difficult for 
opponents to locate. Nevertheless, clearly stated in Article 16 is a 
definition of puberty for girls at nine lunar years and for boys “fifteen 
160 The rules of the temporary marriage would create some problems for liberals, 
even those who might favor legalized forms of prostitution. For example, while 
clearly a woman’s consent is necessary when she is an adult in order to engage in the 
temporary marriage, in many cases a father’s consent is necessary as well. See 
Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶68. Still, the concept of a consensual arrangement that 
involved money for sex might not be deemed to necessarily offend liberal 
sensibilities in a way that a child marriage surely would. 
161 To take the simplest example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
specifically requires that marriage only be entered into “with the free and full consent 
of the intending parties.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.A/810 art 16(b)(Dec. 12, 1948). A 
similar provision is contained in Article 23 of the International Convention for Civil 
and Political Rights, to which 168 nations are party. International Convention for 
Civil and Political Rights, art. 23, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv
-4&lang=en (giving status of signatories to ICCPR)(last checked February 18, 2015). 
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lunar years or the realization of one of the bodily signs depended upon 
by the jurists of the Muslims to establish puberty among males.”162 
Far more interesting are the provisions concerning the marriage of 
children by their guardians. Articles 43(6), 50 and 51 together read as 
follows: 
Article 43 
The soundness of a contract for marriage depends on the following 
conditions: 
(6) that the contracting party is an adult and sane, hence neither the 
contract of an insane person nor the contract for a discerning child 
for himself is sound without the permission of the guardian (the 
father and the paternal grandfather). 
Article 50 
The father and the grandfather from the side of the father when sane 
and Muslim exclusively have the power to marry the small child, 
male and female, or the insane person whose insanity runs through 
puberty.  
Article 51 
The soundness of the marriage of a father or paternal grandfather 
depends on the absence of corruption, and the realization of best 
interest in the contract of marriage. Without it, the soundness of the 
contract depends on the acceptance of it from the child after puberty 
or the insane after recovering sanity.163  
This is largely a repetition of Sistani’s rules, though with two 
important variations. First, nowhere does it suggest, as Sistani does, 
that there is doubt as to the soundness of a marriage that a child 
disavows at puberty when the father or grandfather was not corrupt, 
and had the child’s best interest in mind.164 The Code drafters, that is, 
162 Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note __ at art. 16. 
163 Id. at arts. 43, 50, 51. 
164 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶60. See also notes __ supra, and accompanying 
text. 
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seem to prefer the rules of the earlier jurists which indicate that a father 
or grandfather can absolutely compel a child into marriage as a general 
matter, whether or not the child disavows the marriage at puberty.165 
In other words, offered an opportunity to at least ameliorate some of 
the concerns of liberals and their allies in the international human 
rights community merely by replicating Sistani’s rules, the drafters 
chose to ignore Sistani and use the rules of other jurists instead that 
prove even more problematic from a liberal perspective. 
As to why the drafters did this, the reasons seem clear enough. If 
the aims of the law are to appeal to forces of social conservatism within 
Iraq, then it is well established that child marriage is practiced in 
socially conservative communities, and its prevalence has only risen 
in recent years.166 The fathers and grandfathers in such communities 
would hardly want a court to entertain an objection from their child 
upon reaching puberty that the child disavowed the marriage. Hence, 
Sistani’s comparatively progressive rule was struck in favor of more 
conservative juristic approaches. 
Such an approach is defensible as a realization of Shi’i rules, given 
the juristic disagreement. However, the second change to the juristic 
rules is not. Specifically, the draft Code omits any reference to a 
prohibition against penetrating a girl before she reaches nine or 
attaching consequences if this is done. This is in derogation of all Shi’i 
jurists. There may be two reasons for this omission. The first 
possibility is that the drafters feared some level of backlash by 
including these rules. After all, if they are to indicate that penetration 
of a six year old is a sin, then they must also indicate that “thighing” 
her is not one. Similarly, they must then describe the legal and 
financial consequences if there is in fact penetration that causes 
165 See JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:172-73, 182; Hakim, supra note __ at 
14:433-34. 
166 Iraq Woman Integrated Social and Health Survey, MINISTRY OF PLANNING, 
CENTRAL STATISTICAL ORGANIZATION, (March 2012), 
http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/i-wish_report_english.pdf; see also Gordon Brown, 
Child Marriage Could Become Law in Iraq, But It’s a Global Scourge, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), April 29, 2014. 
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“ripping”. This would call more attention to the matter than merely 
omitting all of these rules might.  
This explanation seems unlikely. If the drafters actually cared 
about global opinion, they could have omitted any mention of child 
marriage as they largely did with temporary marriage, or they could at 
least have rendered its validity dependent on consent at adulthood, as 
Sistani does. The more likely possibility is that the drafters thought 
that socially conservatives might very well wish to engage in sexual 
intercourse with five year olds, and would naturally not want 
significant financial consequences to attach to whatever followed by 
way of physical harm. They thus sought to appease such forces, at the 
expense of the girls so harmed.  
This is of course supposition. What is clear is that whatever the 
reasons for the omissions, under the draft Code, a man can marry a girl 
of any age with her father’s consent, cause any amount of damage to 
her, and no financial consequences of any kind will attach. The 
departure from core doctrinal principles established by the jurists 
should be obvious enough. Wealth transfers are being ignored, 
prohibitions rendered permissible and matters of right set aside in 
order to satisfy socially conservative forces. Whatever the Code might 
be, a faithful rendition of the rules of Shi’ism it most certainly is not. 
III. Reordering the Islamic Law Hierarchy: Tribes over Jurists 
The matters of both temporary marriage and child marriage involve 
circumstances where the drafters of the Ja’fari Code chose to ignore 
particular aspects of Islamic law that social conservatives did not like, 
while enacting those aspects that did appeal to them. The drafters did 
more than this, however. They also in some cases stripped the jurists 
of their storied right to determine, on an exclusive basis, the content of 
Islamic law for the Shi’a. This is deliciously ironic, given that it was 
this right that led to the objections to the existing Personal Status Code 
in the first place.167 An excellent example lies in the case of calculating 
the size of an estate upon death.  
167 See notes __ supra and accompanying text. 
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By way of background, the shari’a across Sunni and Shi’i schools 
does not grant to individuals the right to distribute their assets upon 
death in any manner they prefer. Instead, by operation of law, it 
mandates that the assets be divided into specified portions to be given 
to designated individuals who are usually family members, such as 
children, spouses, parents and siblings of both genders.168 However, a 
decedent is given the ability to dispose of up to one third of his or her 
assets by bequest.169 
In determining the size of the estate out of which one third can be 
bequeathed, Shi’i jurists indicate that not only assets that the decedent 
acquired before death, but also those acquired afterwards would 
count.170A common example given in the juristic texts is something 
that is caught in a net that the decedent had set up before death but 
which was not caught until after death.171 
Also included in the estate is blood money.172 This refers 
specifically to money that is due to be paid to a decedent if someone 
kills or injures the decedent, intentionally or accidentally.173 Across 
the various Islamic schools and sects, the amount that is due varies 
depending on the intent associated with the killing or injury, and the 
gender, religion and status of the victim.174 For example, within 
168 JAMAL J. NASIR, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF PERSONAL STATUS 197 (3d ed. 2002) 
169 Id. 
170 Sistani, supra note __ at 2:¶1381; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1015; Hakim, 
supra note __ at 617-20. 
171 Sistani, supra note __ at 2:¶1381; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1015; Hakim, 
supra note __ at 617. 
172 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 28:290-92; Sistani, supra note __ at 2:¶1381; 
Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1015; Hakim, supra note __ at 617. 
173 The compendia indicate that all blood money that is paid—whether for 
intentional or accidental death, or for injury—are calculated in the estate. See 
Jawahir, supra note __ at 28:290-91; Sistani, supra note __ at 2:¶1381; Khu’i, supra 
note __ at 2:¶1015; Hakim, supra note __ at 619-20. See generally Jawahir, supra 
note __ at .  
174 See Peters, supra note __ at (setting forth the rules across the various Islamic 
schools). The Shi’i rules are laid out in excruciating and often arcane detail in 
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Shi’ism, killing a free175 Muslim man intentionally requires the 
payment of either one hundred specified high quality camels,176 two 
hundred cows,177 one thousand sheep,178 two hundred fine garments 
each consisting of two shirts,179 one thousand dinars (minted gold 
coins),180 or ten thousand dirhams (minted silver coins).181 The 
flexibility in forms of payment is deliberate, so as to enable parties 
living in different areas to be able to pay with items valued in their 
region.182 To give some rough sense of the value, a dinar is 
approximately 75% of the weight of a mithqal of gold.183 Six and two 
thirds mithqal weighs an ounce.184 Thus, 1000 dinars is 750 mithqal, 
which is about 112.5 ounces of gold. The price of gold has varied over 
the past decade from about $1000/oz to $2000/oz,185 placing the value 
of blood money to be paid in case of an intentional homicide between 
$112,000 and $224,000. Killing the same person accidentally (whether 
JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:2-454. It might also be noted that the Article lays out 
in Part II.C.1.b.ii supra an example where blood money would be due to a minor if a 
husband causes her severe injury during sexual intercourse. 
175 I have omitted the rules respecting blood money for slaves in the interests of 
brevity. For further information on Islamic slavery, see Section IV.A infra.  
176 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:4; Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶203. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:4, 10 (taking the position that the garments 
have to be from Yemen); Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶203 (arguing that the garments 
need not be from Yemen). 
180 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:11; Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶203. 
181 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:4. Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶203. 
182 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 8-9. 
183 Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶203. 
184 See Marion Johnson, The Nineteenth Century Gold Mithqal in West and 
North Africa, 9 JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY 57, 547 (1968). 
185 Tables are readily available on the internet which reflect the price of gold 
over the past five years or longer. See, e.g., www.goldprice.org. 
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negligently or not) requires a payment of the same amounts, though if 
paid in camels, the quality of the camels are lower.186 In each case, the 
blood price of a woman is half of that of an equivalent man.187 A 
schedule is set for the blood money due for an intentional and 
unintentional injury to an organ. For example, each eye and ear is 
worth half of a full blood price,188 and a tongue or a nose are worth the 
full blood price.189  
The main difference between intentional and unintentional killing 
or injury lies in the fact that with an unintentional killing, there is no 
option of retribution.190 That is, with an intentional killing or injury, a 
victim (or his representatives if he is dead) may demand that a 
retributive injury of the same type be inflicted on the perpetrator rather 
than receive blood money. To quote the Jawahir,  
[Retribution] means here the satisfaction of the effect of the crime, 
whether it be killing, severing, striking or injuring. The one seeking 
retribution mimics the effect of the crime, and does the same to 
him.191 
Similarly, a Muslim woman could cut the tongue of a Muslim man 
who intentionally cut hers, but she would have to pay half of the blood 
186 Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶209-10. There is an intermediate form of intent, 
roughly equivalent to recklessness, which I do not discuss in the main text. Suffice 
it to say, the blood money is basically the same as for intentional and unintentional 
killings as per above, though if paid in camels, the quality of the camels lies between 
the high quality camels due for an intentional killing, and the somewhat lower quality 
camels due for an intentional one. See JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:17-18. 
187 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:32(respecting Muslim women), 39(respecting 
non-Muslim women); Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶213(respecting Muslim women), 
¶215(respecting non-Muslim women). 
188 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:181, 200; Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶279, 283. 
189 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:190, 209; Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶282. 
190 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 43:3; Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶226. 
191 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 42:7. 
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price first, to make up for the difference in blood money between her 
and the perpetrator.192  
Considerably comforting to liberal and secular forces, however, is 
that these rules bear no resemblance to the manner in which such 
matters are addressed in Iraq. Rather, there are two effective systems 
to deal with intentional and unintentional injury in Iraq. The first is the 
state’s legal system, and the second is the tribal law.193  
The former is broadly relevant as concerns the application of 
criminal law, and it is the product of Western transplant, not shari’a.194 
There is thus no such thing as a retributive injury elected by a victim 
in the Penal Code. The state can pursue the death penalty for murder, 
but if it does not, then a jail term is the alternative.195 Similarly, for 
other injuries, the punishments are jails and fines, not the amputation 
of limbs and the severing of bodily organs.196  
As concerns compensation for an injury, Iraq has an entire 
developed tort system which entitles a victim to compensation for 
material and nonmaterial harm that is caused by the fault of another.197 
Fault is explicitly limited to circumstances where the perpetrator 
intends the injury, or negligently causes it.198 When the resulting injury 
is death, then the victim’s estate may recover for any material harm 
suffered by the victim, and the victim’s family may recover for 
192 Khu’i, supra note __ at 3:¶162 (giving the example of a severed hand). 
193 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Decolonizing the Centralist Mind: Legal Pluralism and 
the Rule of Law in THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW MOVEMENT: A CRISIS OF 
LEGITIMACY AND THE WAY FORWARD 150-53 (2014). 
194 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Religious Minorities and Shari'a in Iraqi Courts, 31 
B.U. Int'l L.J. 387, 403 (2013). 
195 Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, arts. 405-06. 
196 Id. at arts. 412-13. 
197 Civil Code, No. 40 of 1951 (Iraq), arts. 202-05. 
198 Abdul Majid al-Hakim, A Summary of the Theory of Obligation in the Iraqi 
Civil Code 1:215 (1980). 
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emotional harm and mental distress as well.199 The goal is to 
compensate for harm actually incurred.200 Given this, the idea that 
somehow the amount of recovery would be based on gender, or that an 
injury to a nose would be compensated as the same level as a wrongful 
death, would run contrary to the very logic of the system.  
This means of addressing injuries to the person, complete with 
elements of causation,201 the standard of the reasonable person,202 and 
the notion of recovery for emotional distress and mental anguish,203 
would be familiar to any modern civilian or common law lawyer, even 
as it is entirely alien to the jurists of Najaf. And it has been the state’s 
formal means of adjudicating disputes since the promulgation of the 
Civil Code in 1951. Countless numbers of cases are decided annually 
on the basis of this standard.204 
The other manner in which injuries are addressed within Iraq is 
through use of the tribal law. This system is not used to punish 
wrongdoers (though blood feuds can erupt),205 so much as ensure that 
victims are compensated for their injuries. The processes begin with 
an informal notification initiated by one tribe to a second, effectively 
informing them that in its view, a member of the second tribe has 
caused injury to one of the first.206 Should that not lead to satisfaction 
on the part of the injured tribe, then it makes a formal, sterner demand, 
known among the Iraqi tribes as a guama,207 in public view, both to 
199 Civil Code, No. 40 of 1951 (Iraq), arts. 203, 205. 
200 Hakim, supra note __ at 1:201. 
201 Hakim, supra note __ at 1:239-40. 
202 Id. at 1:215. 
203 Id. at 1:212. 
204 Hamoudi, supra note__ at 151. 
205 Hamoudi, Alsharaa and al-Dahhan, supra note __ at 27 (noting a rather 
widespread blood feud that erupted in Basra in 2010 between two rival tribes). 
206 Hamoudi, supra note __ at 151. 
207 The word is an Iraqi dialectical form of the classical Arabic verb qawama, 
which means to resist or to combat. The idea being that the offended tribe is fighting 
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shame the other tribe into negotiating a resolution and to warn of future 
sanctions should the tribe continue to refuse.208 Most tribes against 
which a guama is initiated seek resolution soon thereafter if they think 
one of their members is indeed responsible for an injury.209 This is 
because a tribe against which a claim is made is well aware that it 
might have a claim to make in the future, and hence there is little 
advantage in developing a reputation for recalcitrance.210 In the 
minority of cases where there is no agreement to resolve, the matter is 
escalated to what is known as the degga,211 which involves spraying 
the house of the perpetrator with bullets when nobody is expected to 
be home.212 Much like the guama, this serves both as reputational 
sanction (as the bullet holes are rather obvious to any onlooker) and as 
a warning of further repercussions, albeit in a far more confrontational 
fashion than the guama.213 The degga can be repeated any number of 
times, with increasing levels of threatened violence.214  
At some point during this process, one of three outcomes will 
ensue. The injured party might relent. This is unusual. However, it 
could occur if the allegedly offending party demands the matter be 
arbitrated, and the parties agree on an arbitrator who finds that the 
injury is not the responsibility of the allegedly offending party.215 The 
second possibility is that a full-fledged feud develops between the 
tribes. While this does happen, it results in levels of violence that 
back, in a sense, against the wrong done to it. HANS WEHR, A DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 934 (J. Milton Cowan ed., 4th ed. 1994). 
208 Hamoudi, supra note __ at 151. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 This term is an Iraqi dialectical form of the classical Arabic verb daqqa, 
meaning to pound, strike or beat. Wehr, supra note __ at 331. 
212 Hamoudi, supra note __ at 151. 
213 Id. 
214 Hamoudi, Alsharaa and Al-Dahhan, supra note __ at 15. 
215 Id. at 16; see also Hamoudi, supra note __ at 151. 
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attract state attention and is thus usually avoided.216 Finally, the 
offending tribe can relent, and request a respite, or atwa, to gather its 
members.217 Following this, it pays a visit to the home of the injured 
member of the other tribe to discuss compensation.218 In these 
discussions, to the extent they involve a lost life, there is reference to 
the blood money that can be demanded, usually in the form of sheep.219 
Eventually, after much pleading and discussion, the tribes settle on a 
sum, which is usually paid immediately in cash.220 In more remote 
areas, the settlement can involve the trading of women as well, where 
a woman from one tribe is delivered to another to compensate for an 
injury done to it.221 
This is but a summary rendition of the rich and complex area of 
Iraqi tribal dispute resolution, but it is sufficient to demonstrate 
important differences from the Islamic law of homicide and wounding. 
Nonphysical, moral injuries arising, for example, from defamation or 
slander, are quite commonly those for which compensation is 
demanded among the tribes.222 By contrast, the Shi’i jurists make no 
mention of such nonphysical injuries, nor does the system they have 
created seem to allow space for them, given the lack of any sense in 
inflicting a retributive injury or ascribing a “blood price” to reputation, 
as opposed to an organ or a limb. In addition, many types of settlement, 
including the trading of women, have no Islamic analogue. A 
perpetrator may pay blood money in any of a number of forms under 
the Shi’i rules, but the offering of women for marriage is not one of 
216 Hamoudi, Alsharaa and Al-Dahhan, supra note __ at 27. 
217 Hamoudi, supra note __ at 152. 
218 Hamoudi, Alsharaa and Al-Dahhan, supra note __ at 18. 
219 Interview with Sheikh Mazen Falih Muhammad al-‘Araiby, clan elder of the 
Muhammadawi tribe, in Sadr City, Iraq (April 25, 2013). 
220 Hamoudi, Alsharaa and Al-Dahhan, supra note __ at 18. 
221 Id. at 27. 
222 See id. at 22 (pointing out that slander is one area that tribes insist they 
address entirely on their own, without state court involvement). 
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them.223 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the looming threat 
under which the negotiations take place in Islamic law is the exacting 
of physical retribution, at least for intentional harms,224 and not the 
reputational sanctions that appear to motivate the tribe.225 
It is just as important to note that within Iraq, there is no significant 
social or political movement that seems terribly interested in 
implementing the Islamic system concerning homicide and physical 
injury to the person.226 Liberals and secularists who live 
overwhelmingly in the large cities obviously prefer the existing 
transplanted state system. The tribes that make up an important part of 
the socially conservative constituency in urban shantytowns and rural 
areas throughout Iraq227 likewise must have no interest in an Islamic 
state system. Surely if they did, they would already be implementing 
an Islamic system on their own rather than relying on tribal law.  
The drafters thus had three options. The first, which would be the 
way of Islamic purity, would make reference to blood money as being 
included in the value of an estate, and then leave to the legislature the 
later task of reforming tort law to define what blood money is and how 
it is to be calculated. Another way would be to placate liberals by 
simply indicating that the value of the estate includes wealth acquired 
by the decedent after death, including any amounts accruing to the 
decedent by virtue of the decedent’s death being caused by another. 
This would hardly be endorsing the current state system for 
determining redress for injury. After all, the amounts referred to as 
arising out of death caused by another could be blood money just as 
223 See notes __ supra and accompanying text (describing different mediums 
that can be used to pay blood money due). 
224 See notes __ supra and accompanying text (describing retributive injuries). 
225 Hamoudi, Alsharaa and Al-Dahhan, supra note __ at 14-15 (noting 
importance of reputation among tribes). 
226 Hamoudi (Death of Islamic Law), supra note __ at 327. 
227 HUSSEIN D. HASSAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22626, IRAQ: TRIBAL 
STRUCTURE, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 1 (April 7, 2008). 
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easily as they could be ordinary damages for wrongful death. But at 
least such a provision would recognize state law enough as to permit a 
person to bequeath amounts that the estate receives after death through 
the adjudication or settlement of a modern tort claim. 
Yet as we have seen time and again, the Code was not drafted to 
placate liberals, nor was it drafted to actually implement Islamic law 
in any recognizably “pure” form. Rather, it was designed to satisfy 
socially conservative elements of Iraqi society. Hence, the drafters 
therefore opted for a different course, one that effectively deferred to 
the tribes over the jurists in the proper understanding of Islamic law. 
That is, the Code refused to recognize state law rules on wrongful 
death while simultaneously declaring tribal law as Islamic, despite its 
obvious derogation from the rules of the Shi’i jurists. Specifically, 
Article 25 reads as follows: 
The estate is calculated by what the person owned at his death, but 
what enters into his possession after death does not count, with the 
exception of the blood money for a mistaken or intentional killing, if 
the representatives of the decedent reconcile themselves to that. 
Within this is the tribal resolution, given that it is part of the blood 
money.228 
This changes the juristic rules in two important ways. First of all, 
it generally excludes sums that would have accrued to the estate under 
juristic rules, such as the fish caught after the death of the decedent in 
a trap the decedent had set.229 The effect of this is that if the state 
awarded compensation for wrongful death to a person, the person 
could not bequeath any of those funds. Perhaps the drafters felt this to 
be appropriate because funds awarded for wrongful death by an Iraqi 
court applying a modern Civil Code are not Islamic in origin, indeed 
they derogate from the Shi’i juristic rules concerning blood money, 
and thus deserve no recognition in a Shi’i Personal Status Code. As the 
drafters could not change the Civil Code, they merely changed the rule 
228 Draft Ja’fari Code, supra note __ at art. 25. 
229 See notes __ supra and accompanying text (describing rule and juristic 
support for it).  
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to render such sums unrecoverable, thereby arguably retaining the 
substance of the juristic rule, if not the form.  
Whatever the plausibility of this, it disappears entirely when 
contrasted with the preference of the social conservative to administer 
compensation according to a tribal system rather than Islamic law. This 
is because the drafters did not treat tribal resolutions the same as state 
law judgments for wrongful death adjudicated under a more secular 
Civil Code. Instead, they declared tribal resolutions to be themselves 
the realization of Islamic principles respecting recovery of blood 
money. No qualification is given to this. There is no suggestion, for 
example, that if the tribal resolution involves processes (such as bullet 
spraying) or forms of payment (such as women for marriage) that are 
not juristic in provenance, or if it involves compensation for harm to 
reputation (such as slander) that are not juristically recognized, then 
these would not be included in the decedent’s assets. They are 
included, because the law declares anything recovered under tribal 
resolution to be the payment of blood money by definition. The tribes 
thus have as much right as the jurists to determine the content of 
Islamic law.  
For a Code specifically drafted to realize the right of the jurists to 
set the law of personal status for the Shi’a, this is truly remarkable. It 
appears that the problem for the drafters of the Code with the existing 
Personal Status Code was not that it granted to individuals other than 
the jurists the power to determine the content of Islamic law. The draft 
Code does that as well. The problem instead is that it gave such power 
to the wrong people; specifically, progressives, rather than tribes intent 
on preserving existing hierarchies and structural iniquities. 
IV. Strategic Juristic Omission 
A. On Islamic Slavery and the Nature of Juristic Omission 
This Article to date has focused on the means by which Iraqi 
lawmakers drafting a personal status code altered religious rules to 
meet the expectations of socially conservative forces whose claim of 
fealty to those same rules was more rhetorical than real. Yet it is not 
only purely political figures such as lawmakers who manipulate and 
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prevaricate in order to change the substance of religious rules in order 
to comply with the demands of a constituency. Jurists do much of the 
same, as this Part will show. 
It is important to distinguish this phenomenon from a juristic 
reassessment of the corpus of the shari’a that either explicitly or 
implicitly rejects, limits or alters earlier rules based on alternative 
readings of source text. Such a reassessment would simply be doctrinal 
evolution, no different from changes in constitutional understanding 
that occur in high courts around the world over the span of decades.230 
Indeed, the Article points to one prominent example where such a 
reassessment appears to have taken place. Sistani suggests, in a manner 
that earlier prominent jurists did not,231 that there is doubt as to the 
validity of a marriage arranged for a girl by her father if she disavows 
it at puberty.232 While Sistani does not explain the basis for his position 
or its variance with earlier determinations, the change is unmistakable. 
That said, at least from the standpoint of a liberal, over the past two 
centuries, jurists have been broadly unwilling to undertake a serious 
and thorough examination of the rules they have derived, with the 
deplorable results described above relating to matters such as child 
marriage233 and the reduction of marriage to the bartering over sexual 
access.234 Instead, quite often, rather than revisit particularly 
unattractive rules, they leave them undiscussed. The jurist does not 
change the previous rule, so much as reduce treatment of it in a fashion 
that almost misrepresents it. Alternatively, the jurist might just not 
230 Hence, for example, Barry Friedman indicates that in its rulings across two 
centuries, the Supreme Court has largely adopted constitutional understandings that 
conform to popular expectations, and that its legitimacy has suffered when it has 
failed to do so. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC 
INFLUENCE HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 9-15 (2009). 
231 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 29:172-73, 182; Hakim, supra note __ at 14:433-
34. 
232 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶60. 
233 See Part II.C.i supra. 
234 See notes __ supra and accompanying text. 
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discuss the rule at all, thereby leading the faithful who do not spend 
time reading compendia decades old unaware that such a rule could 
ever have existed within Shi’ism. I refer to these processes as 
“strategic juristic omission.” 
The most obvious example of this is slavery. The juristic 
compendia of all of the major jurists of Najaf through Grand Ayatollah 
Khu’i, Sistani’s immediate predecessor, go into great detail in their 
treatment of marriage on the rules respecting marriage to, and 
intercourse with, female slaves.235 Hence, where Sistani speaks in the 
passage set forth on pp. __ above as marriage236 being “of two types,” 
Khu’i instead lists three types of licit sexual intercourse.237 In addition 
to permanent marriage and temporary marriages, there is also “the 
ownership of the right hand”, meaning intercourse with slaves.238 An 
entire section follows shortly thereafter entitled “On the permissibility 
of enjoying female slaves and licit sexual intercourse with them.”239 
This is in addition to countless other references to the practice of 
235 It is important to note that slavery historically appears in far more sections 
than the book of marriage. There is an entire section, or “book”, devoted to 
manumission, for example. See generally, e.g., JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 34: 86-
193. Even more prominently, the Book of Sale in almost any Sunni or Shi’i juristic 
compendium written prior to the twentieth century contains extensive rules 
respecting the purchase or sale of human beings. See Ali, supra note __ at 7 (pointing 
out the usefulness to medieval jurists of using slaves as examples in commercial 
transactions). As these bear less direct of a connection to matters of personal status, 
I do not discuss them in the main text. 
236 The term I have translated here as “licit sexual intercourse” is nikah, which 
is the same word Sistani uses and which I refer to generally as “marriage.” The 
translation of nikah as marriage is largely accurate but an important nuance arises in 
the context of slavery. Specifically, nikah can include permissible forms of 
intercourse beyond those of permanent and temporary marriage, and in particular sex 
with female slaves. Hence, in this specific context alone, I refer to nikah as “licit 
sexual intercourse” rather than “marriage” even though ordinarily, and certainly in 
modern parlance, it is understood to be virtually synonymous with marriage. 
237 Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:p.257.  
238 Id.  
239 Id. at ¶1320-40. 
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slavery within the compendium, from the inability of an owner of two 
female slaves who are sisters to enjoy intercourse with both of them so 
long as he continues to own both240 to rules concerning the attribution 
of children of slaves to their masters under circumstances where the 
slave has (unlawfully) endured intercourse with more than one man.241 
Khu’i’s treatment is common; nearly every Shi’i juristic text prior to 
his contains broad and extensive rules concerning when a slave may 
be married, when she may be “enjoyed” and the rules and conditions 
for each.242  
Sistani’s texts lack all such references, containing rules only as 
they concern free people. Is this then an implicit rebuke to Khu’i, and 
a rejection of the longstanding rules within the shari’a as they concern 
marriage and slavery? It would certainly be encouraging to think so. 
However, Sistani appears to be doing something else. He seems to 
want neither to cast aside the extensive and thorough rules of slavery 
set forth by his predecessors, nor to repeat them given both their 
irrelevance and their potential for subjecting him, and the clerical 
academies generally, to criticism for endorsing a practice broadly 
regarded as abhorrent in the modern era among liberals and 
conservatives alike.  
He thus indicates he will not address slavery, but does so in a 
notable fashion. Following a rule in which he declares the birth control 
practice of withdrawal as permissible, if reprehensible, the following 
footnote appears: 
This is the rule for a free woman, but for a female slave withdrawal 
from her is permitted absolutely, and without it being reprehensible. 
It should be noted that the subject of the rules mentioned in this book 
are for free men and women. As for the male and female slave, they 
differ from this in some of their rulings. We have omitted–for the 
240 Id. at ¶1255. 
241 Id. at ¶1374. 
242 See, e.g., Hakim, supra note __ at 14:278-367 (containing extensive rules of 
marriage as they pertain to slaves); JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 30:202-314 (same). 
                                                     
62 DRAFT—Errors and Omissions possible. Do not cite without author’s 
permission. 
most part—laying out their rules because we are not afflicted with it 
in this era.243  
There are several matters of significance to note. The first is that 
of all places to include this reference to the omission of slavery, this is 
possibly among the most obscure. The more logical place would be 
later, when discussing the three types of licit sexual intercourse that 
exist within the juristic rules. This seems an effort to bury the 
information.  
Second, even if a person finds the footnote, they are unlikely to pay 
it much heed. A seminary student attached to juristic tradition is led to 
think this is a mere nod to practicality, it will mean nothing to a social 
conservative for whom slavery is not a current practice, and even a 
critic might only glance at the information without much thought. The 
permissibility of sex with the slave is oblique, after all, and only in the 
context of a relatively harmless rule relating primarily to birth control. 
Finally, while Sistani’s purported explanation for omitting the 
rules concerning the “enjoyment” of female slaves may seem 
defensible at first glance, in fact in broader context it hardly seems so. 
After all, the marriage of six year olds has been illegal in Iraq for 
decades as well under the existing Personal Status Code, and yet 
Sistani mentions the rules respecting that practice in ample detail.244 
Using the same approach would lead to Sistani describing rules 
respecting the enjoyment of female slaves, and Islamist parties 
demanding those rules be recognized in law. 
In addition, Sistani’s rules concerning the payment of blood money 
are not recognized in Iraqi law either, and yet again, he continues to 
mention them, and the drafters of the Ja’fari Code replicate that rather 
243 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶10 n. 1. 
244 Compare Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8 (indicating no intercourse with girls 
under nine), ¶59 (granting father and paternal grandfather the power to contract 
marriage for a minor) with Personal Status Code, No. 188 of 1959 (Iraq) art. 7 (“The 
conditions for competency to marry are sanity and the completion of eighteen 
years”); 9(1)(“No relative or anyone else has the right to force any person, male or 
female, to marry without their permission.”) 
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than dismiss it as irrelevant in our times.245 Sistani even has a rule 
permitting a woman to invalidate her marriage to a husband if, after 
she contracts it, she learns that he has been castrated.246 In a world of 
harems and eunuchs, this may have been relevant, but it is hard to 
believe that this happens with any frequency today at all. If the 
touchstone for what is and is not to be mentioned in the juristic rules 
is purely relevance, then there is much that requires excision. 
Rather, Sistani seems to be engaging in strategic juristic omission. 
In other words, he is deferring to the expectations of his constituency 
in what he chooses to mention and to omit. As noted above, child 
marriage exists in Iraq within Shi’i conservative communities, and 
Sistani’s refusal to discuss it on the grounds that marriage of minors is 
a matter with which we are “not afflicted” in this era would be both 
counterfactual and harmful to his status as Najaf’s premier jurist. It 
would seem to privilege Iraqi law over Shi’i practice in a manner that 
many conservative Shi’a might find objectionable. By contrast, 
because the modern principles underlying the abolition of slavery have 
largely been internalized across the Iraqi political spectrum,247 the 
deference to Iraqi law is sensible. It meets with no objections among 
Sistani’s core conservative constituency, and avoids miring him in 
matters that could lead to broad international condemnation. 
When the matter is slavery, it is nearly impossible for a Grand 
Ayatollah to be anything but explicit in noting omissions. The rules on 
sex with and marriage to slaves are too extensively laid out, in far too 
much detail, over too many sources,248 to be able to exclude them 
without some sort of explanation as to why one is doing so. To pretend 
245 See notes __ supra and accompanying text. 
246 Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶268(2). 
247 Freamon properly notes that there is a broad condemnation of the practice of 
slavery in contemporary Muslim societies. Bernard K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, 
and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 
7 (1998). As Freamon noted then, and as is even truer now, there are some number 
of groups who continue to engage in and defend the practice of slavery, but the 
consensus remains firmly against the practice. See Freamon, supra at 5-6. 
248 See notes __ supra and accompanying text. 
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they do not exist would strain the credulity of anyone even faintly 
familiar with juristic texts. 
In other cases, the discrepancies are subtle enough that it is hard to 
know whether what is taking place is strategic juristic omission, as 
with slavery, or the reaching of a different conclusion concerning the 
source text, as with Sistani’s rules concerning the right of a girl to 
disavow a marriage at puberty.249 It is not clear, for example, whether 
Grand Ayatollahs Khu’i and Sistani disagree with an earlier primus 
inter pares Grand Ayatollah of Najaf, Muhsin al-Hakim, in his 
determination that it is recommended to imprison a wife in her home, 
so that she does not leave except when necessary.250 Neither recounts 
the rule, nor do they recount Hakim’s stated recommendation that there 
be haste in setting a marriage for a woman once she does reach the age 
of nine because it is better for a girl not to menstruate in her father’s 
home.251 This may reflect strategic omission, and there would be good 
reason for it. After all, very devout women do frequently leave the 
home in modern Iraq. Indeed the much heralded sister of one 
prominent cleric spent a great deal of time promoting modern Islamist 
notions among women and lost her life in 1980 because of it.252 It is 
one thing to indicate she requires her husband’s permission to do this, 
as Sistani and Khu’i both do.253 It is quite another to say it is preferable 
that she have remained locked in her home, as Hakim does.254 
Similarly, while some Iraqis do marry their daughters at nine, a good 
249 See notes __ supra and accompanying text referring to Sistani’s rule, and its 
variance from existing juristic precedent. 
250 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:11. 
251 Id. 
252 Joyce Wiley, ‘Alima Bint al-Huda: Women’s Advocate in THE MOST 
LEARNED OF THE SHI’A: THE INSTITUTION OF MARJA’ TAQLID 149-50, 157 
(Walbridge ed. 2001).  
253 See Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶337; Khu’i, supra note __ at 2:¶1407. 
254 Hakim, supra note __ at 14:11. 
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many do not, and would not appreciate being told it would be favored 
if they did. 
At the same time, these positions are not so deeply and broadly 
established in Shi’i texts that one could discount the possibility that 
Sistani and Khu’i reached different legal conclusions from that of 
Hakim rather than exercised strategic juristic omission. That those 
conclusions could have been driven by the social and political 
circumstances described in the previous paragraph is obvious, but 
nevertheless, this would hardly be an example of strategic juristic 
omission. 
The most interesting cases, however, lie between the poles of 
slavery on the one hand, where omission is necessarily explicit, and 
recommendations respecting the imprisonment of wives on the other, 
where there may not even be omission so much as doctrinal evolution. 
These are the cases where the source material is extensive enough that 
one would expect either a replication of the rules of earlier jurists, or a 
repudiation of the same with an alternative reading, but not so 
extensive that the jurist is forced to acknowledge the omission openly. 
The resulting silence can only be explained by way of deference to 
modern socially conservative expectations, even at the expense of 
altering contemporary understandings of the firmly established 
doctrine. An excellent case is provided as concerns the subject of 
female genital mutilation as described further below.  
B. On Strategic Juristic Omission and Female Genital Mutilation 
Female genital mutilation has significant pedigree within historic 
Shi’i doctrine. A reasonably extensive treatment of the subject can be 
found in the Jawahir, as follows: 
As for females, it is referred to among the companions as “the 
curtailing of the maidens” and it is “recommended” without 
disagreement. To the contrary, the consensus supports it, and the 
[original] sources are plentiful or incontrovertible, and present the 
matter in its entirety. It is not required for the guardian [to do] before 
puberty, nor incumbent upon [the maidens] after it. The manifest 
opinion is that the time for them is seven years [after adulthood; i.e. 
the age of 16]. Indeed based on the report of Giyath ibn Ibrahim from 
Ja’far ibn Muhammad [al-Sadiq] from his father [Muhammad al-
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Baqir], peace be upon the latter two of them, “do not curtail the 
maiden until she is an adult seven years.” 
It is required not to uproot it in its entirety. From the Sahih of Ibn 
Muslim, from Abi Abdillah (peace be upon him), when the women 
emigrated to the Apostle of God (peace be upon him), a woman 
emigrated with them who was called “Um Habeeb”, and she was a 
curtailer, who curtailed maidens. When the Apostle of God, peace be 
upon him, saw her, he [peace be upon him] said to her, “Um Habeeb, 
the work that you used to do, do you do it now?” She said to him 
[peace be upon him], “yes, Apostle of God, unless it is forbidden, 
and you tell me to avoid it. So he said, “no it is permissible. Come 
near me, so I may teach you.” She neared him, and he said, “Um 
Habeeb, if you do it, then do not destroy and do not remove entirely, 
but mark it, for this brightens the face and is more pleasurable for the 
husband.” 
“And” in any event what is clear from what we have mentioned is 
that “if an uncircumcised nonbeliever becomes a Muslim, he must 
circumcise” himself “if he was of old age. . . . and” it is clear also 
that “if a woman becomes a Muslim” then “she is not obligated to be 
circumcised” but that is “recommended” for her. In the report of Abi 
Basir, “I asked the father of Ja’far, peace be upon him, about the 
maiden who comes from the land of polytheism and she becomes 
Muslim, and she asks for one to curtail her, but she is unable to find 
a woman [to do it], so he said, “the Sunna [i.e. the practice of the 
Prophet and the Imams] for circumcision is for men, and not for 
women.”255 
This is the main passage in that extensive compendium spanning 
43 volumes that addresses the question of female genital mutilation. 
Thus, unlike slavery, the references to it are not extensive in the 
historic juristic texts, nor are they repeated with frequency. That said, 
the passage is detailed enough to make clear that the traditional juristic 
position in favor of female genital mutilation is a reasonably well 
established one. It appears, after all, in one of the most influential 
compendia of the nineteenth century, one that is the subject of intense 
255 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:262-63 
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study in the seminaries of Najaf today256 and that is itself an extended 
commentary of one of the most influential juristic works in the history 
of Shi’ism, the thirteenth century Shara’i al-Islam of Muhaqqaq al-
Hilli.257 (Al-Hilli’s original text appears in the Jawahir in quotation 
marks, which is reflected in the translated passage above.) Moreover, 
the passage describes the original source material upon which the 
opinion is based as at the very least “plentiful” (mustafidha) if not so 
well established as to be “incontrovertible” (mutawatir).258 It does not 
obligate women to have their genitalia mutilated, but it does indicate 
that to do so would be a religiously recommended act.259 
At the same time, the practice of female genital mutilation is 
extremely rare, if not entirely absent, among Iraq’s Arab Shi’a.260 
There is no expectation that women would undergo the procedure.261 
To demand something so alien, or even to recommend it, is to risk 
alienating an important constituency that regards juristic dictate as 
important.  
It therefore comes as little surprise that modern jurists do not call 
attention to the historic rule respecting female genital mutilation, and 
indeed have begun to engage in strategic juristic omission with respect 
256 See ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, THE JUST RULER IN SHI’ITE ISLAM: THE 
COMPREHENSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE JURIST IN IMAMITE JURISPRUDENCE 22 
(1988)(describing the influence of the Jawahir). For a less sober and academic 
account, one popular website describes the Jawahir as “an indispensable companion 
of every [jurist] worth any name, since each line in it requires profound pondering 
and elucidation.” (sic). Allamah Shaikh Muhammad Hasan Najafi 'Sahib-e-Jawahir', 
IMAM REZA (A.S.) NETWORK, 
http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=6934 (last checked, Feb. 23, 2015). 
257 SACHEDINA, supra note __ at 14. 
258 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:262. 
259 Id. 
260 Ian Black and Fazel Hawramy, ISIS Denies Ordering That All Girls in Mosul 
Undergo FGM, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2014)(quoting an Iraqi newspaper to the 
effect that “the practice of FGM is alien to Iraqi society except the Kurdish 
provinces.”) 
261 See id. (noting total absence of FGM in Iraq outside of the Kurdish areas). 
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to it. They have not, to reemphasize the point, reexamined the source 
material to challenge the conclusions of the 17th century Jawahir, nor 
those of Muhaqqiq al-Hilli upon which it is based. Nowhere do they 
challenge, for example, the conclusion of the Jawahir that the original 
source material leads to an “incontrovertible” conclusion 
recommending female genital mutilation, nor do they offer a different 
understanding of precisely what the Prophet Muhammad was saying 
to Umm Habeeb, and what lessons might be drawn from it. Such 
approaches might be eminently plausible to be clear, but those are the 
methods of the liberal and the reformer, not those of the traditionalist 
seminaries who currently pronounce Shi’i doctrine. Instead, the 
authorities at first reduced the rule, and ultimately stopped referring it 
entirely. 
The process of reduction, and indeed prevarication, begins with 
Grand Ayatollah Khu’i. His compendium reflects the rule, but in so 
reduced a form that it effectively changes its meaning. Khu’i 
specifically states as follows: 
It is recommended to wash the newborn and read the call to prayer 
in his right ear, and the preparation for prayer (‘iqama) in the left, to 
place the earth of Husayn, peace be upon him, in his mouth, mixed 
with the water of the Euphrates,262 and name with a name of one of 
the Prophets or Imams, peace be upon them, and giving him a 
nickname (but not to nickname a Muhammad with “Abi Qasim),263 
to shave his head on the seventh day, and a celebration afterwards, 
to give as charity the weight of his hair in gold or silver, to pierce his 
ear and circumcise him, and circumcision is obligatory after puberty 
262 Perhaps the central legend around which Shi’ism is based is the death of 
Husayn bin Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, in the plains known today 
as Kerbala along the banks of the Euphrates River. Momen, supra note __ at 30-31. 
Hence the juristic rule that recommends that a child upon birth first taste the earth of 
Kerbala, mixed with the water of the Euphrates. 
263 The Prophet Muhammad is referred to as “Abi Qasim”, or father of Qasim, 
because this was the name of his first born son. TARIQ RAMADAN, IN THE FOOTSTEPS 
OF THE PROPHET: LESSONS FROM THE LIFE OF MUHAMMAD 219 n.8 (2007). As a 
result, the nickname is deemed inappropriate for a person named Muhammad 
according to Khu’i. 
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if he has not been circumcised earlier. The curtailing of the maidens 
is recommended, even if they reach adulthood, but the preference is 
seven years after their adulthood.264 
In the first place, it is quite notable that as with Sistani in his rules 
respecting slavery,265 Khu’i clearly attempts not to bring very much 
attention to this rule by burying it in a series of other rules most of 
which plainly pertain exclusively to boys, such as circumcision on the 
seventh day, and the naming of a name of a Prophet or Imam. Only at 
the end of this litany is the “curtailment of the maidens” even 
mentioned. 
The reduction of the broader treatment in the Jawahir is also 
interesting because the term used for “maidens” (jawari in Arabic) 
could also very likely mean “slave girls,” as indeed it commonly 
does.266 Clearly the term does not always mean that. Section II.B 
above includes a passage of a temporary marriage to a “maiden” who 
demands a dower in advance, and as slaves could not marry without 
permission of their master, the implication appears to be that she is 
free.  
More importantly, the “curtailment” is plainly not restricted to 
female slaves in the Jawahir. Indeed, the passage itself refers to the 
“circumcision” of females267 (after similar passages relating to the 
circumcision of males),268 and indicates that this has been referred to 
historically as “curtailment of the maidens.” The final paragraph, 
respecting female genital mutilation for a converted Muslim, refers 
specifically to it being recommended for “a woman” (mar’a) but not 
required.269 An earlier passage indicates the circumcision of men as 
264 Khu’i, supra note __ at ¶1372. 
265 See notes __ supra and accompanying text. 
266 Hence, for example, Khu’i refers elsewhere to obligations on a person who 
“purchases a maiden.” Khu’i, supra note __ at ¶1336. 
267 JAWAHIR, supra note __ at 31:262. The specific term is anath, which 
unmistakably refers to all females. 
268 Id. at 31:260-62. 
269 Id. 
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being obligatory because it was a tradition of the Prophet, while the 
“circumcision” of “women” (nisa’) is merely “noble” and therefore 
recommended rather than required.270 
Yet reviewing Khu’i’s considerably reduced rules alone and 
without the benefit such careful, extended treatment hardly leaves the 
same impression. The matter might very well seem to have something 
to do with female slaves, but not free women. After all, Khu’i does lay 
out the rules respecting “the enjoyment of the female slaves” in some 
level of detail.271 The term used for “female slave” (‘ama) is different 
in that context than the word “maiden” used in the context of 
“curtailment,” but one not predisposed to believe that Shi’ism endorses 
the mutilation of female genitals might not dwell long on the curious 
discrepancy.  
Several decades later, Khu’i’s successor as primus inter pares in 
Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, removed the rules respecting 
curtailment entirely. This might lead a reader to confirm in their mind 
that indeed the matter related only to slave girls. After all, as discussed 
above, Sistani excised all of the rules relating to slavery.272 Hence, it 
would make sense that he did not mention “curtailing” female slaves. 
That earlier, authoritative jurists had found it near incontrovertible that 
mutilating the genitalia of all females was recommended at the age of 
sixteen is left well disguised, so well that few to none of the socially 
conservative Shi’a dominating Iraq’s south would have any reason to 
know the actual rule, which reflects values that clearly are not present 
in their own society.273 
Of course, any legislator has a very easy time conforming a draft 
law such as the Ja’afari Personal Status Code to modern, socially 
conservative expectations in cases of strategic juristic omission. The 
legislator need only follow the lead of the jurist who has already done 
270 Id. at 261. 
271 Khu’i, supra note __ at ¶1320-40. 
272 See notes __ supra and accompanying text. 
273 See Black and Hawramy, supra note __. 
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the work of masking parts of the doctrine to meet social demands. All 
references to slavery can be omitted, as well as recommendations to 
imprison women and mutilate their genitals. If anyone were to ask 
precisely why the legislator had done this, the legislator need only 
hand the person making the objection a copy of Sistani’s compendium 
and ask where such rules appear such that they require recognition in 
law. The mask thus works, and the distortion to conform to 
conservative expectations is complete.  
It is therefore of little to no surprise that the draft Code does not 
recommend genital mutilation and omits all rules concerning the 
enjoyment of female slaves. That does nothing, however, to evade the 
central fact that such rules are very much part of the Shi’i tradition. If 
a code were truly intended to replicate that tradition, as was claimed, 
such rules should be present. That a jurist found it prudent not to talk 
about such matters hardly is a reason to ignore them, if the effort is 
intended to realize the long established rules of the tradition. If, 
however, it is to enact a law that meets with the expectations and 
desires of Muslim social conservatives, then of course there is much 
advantage in using the juristic cover already provided. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that the persistence of the 
equivalence between Islamic social conservatism and adherence to 
religious rules is false.  Yet in these final few paragraphs, I thought it 
important to note that it is also positively dangerous in the large part 
of the world where the central role of Islam in establishing legal order 
is rarely questioned.274 So long as Islam retains this position, then there 
274 To give a sense of the considerable popularity of Islam generally, and the 
shari’a particularly, as a source of legal order, the Pew Research Center undertook a 
broad and extensive survey in 2013 respecting attitudes religion, politics and society 
in the Muslim world. The study showed that “[o]verwhelming percentages of 
Muslims in many countries want Islamic law (sharia) to be the official law of the 
land.” The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, Pew Research Center: 
Religion and Public Life (April 30, 2013), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-
society-overview/. 
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is very clearly a problem with attributing the preferences of social 
conservatives to the realization of “strict” shari’a, while describing 
those of Muslim liberals as “reformist.” The social conservative is then 
seen as pure, unmotivated by any ideological, political or social 
concerns beyond those of faithfully fulfilling God’s Will. Pursuant to 
this vision, it is not that the Minister of Justice,275 or at least the core 
constituency whose support he courts, wants fathers to be able to marry 
their infant daughters to middle aged men who will “thigh” them.276 It 
is that God deems it permissible, and the Minister can do no more than 
humbly and piously do His Will. 
Yet as we have seen, the Code almost entirely ignores a rather 
central part of Shi’i marriage doctrine, and one discussed at some 
length by jurists across the span of centuries. This is the “temporary 
marriage”, where one contracts with a woman to marry her for a short 
span of time, with the barter being explicitly the trade of money, in the 
form of a dower, for sexual enjoyment.277 In the absence of any set of 
rules governing the practice in the draft Ja’fari Code, it would appear 
to fall within the definition of prostitution under Iraqi law, a crime that 
is punishable by life imprisonment.278 In other words, in Iraq today, a 
woman would go to jail for life for agreeing to be sexually available to 
a man for an hour in exchange for a sum of money, even though the 
jurists specifically permit this practice. The draft Code does nothing to 
change that result. 
275 See notes __ supra and accompanying text (describing the role of the Minister 
of Justice in promulgating the draft Ja’fari Code). 
276 See Sistani, supra note __ at 3:¶8; Hakim, supra note __ at 14:79-80. See also 
notes __ and accompanying text supra. 
277 See Part II.B supra. 
278 Prostitution was punishable by death until 2003, when the death penalty was 
suspended and replaced by life imprisonment. Revolutionary Command Council 
Decree No. 234 of 2001 (Iraq), art. 3, available at http://gjpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/rcc-resolution-234-of-2001.pdf as amended by Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order 7, art. 3(1) (June 10, 2003). 
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One could imagine a different result, a libertarian one that imposed 
life imprisonment on anyone performing any sort of sexual act with a 
child, but legalized a temporary marriage between consenting adults. 
It is hardly obvious that, were it ever advocated, it would represent a 
more radical departure from juristic rules than the draft Code, which 
legalizes child marriage and leaves temporary marriage illegal and 
subject to harsh punishment. There is no reason to call one of these 
approaches “pure” or “literal” while describing the other as 
“reformist.” To do so delegitimizes the libertarian approach as the 
contamination of doctrine while sanctifying the socially conservative 
one as somehow in close adherence to it. This leaves the content of the 
shari’a in the firm grip of social conservatives, and makes meaningful 
reassessment of the doctrinal tradition in a more progressive direction 
all the harder to achieve. 
In the end, the debate is hardly about literal adherence to any 
doctrine, as nobody is really attempting that. It is instead about 
ideological preferences. Do we seek an Islam that recognizes the 
inherent worth of the individual, grants individuals the freedom to 
make their own decisions respecting matters such as marriage and 
religion, seeks to protect disadvantaged groups from discrimination, 
and permits and protects challenges to existing hierarchies and 
modalities of authority? Or do we prefer a preservation of those 
existing hierarchies and modalities, so that men control the lives 
women, fathers control the lives of children, tribes control the lives of 
their members, and each has the duty to obey those in authority over 
them? Neither is more literal, neither more faithful to any preexisting 
doctrine. The doctrine is merely the mask. It is beyond time to rip it 
off. 
